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The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the 
potential capabilities and limitations of the modeling and 
simulation (M&S) strategy used by the U.s. Army for 
acquisition purposes. This thesis considers the Army's 
current acquisition process, M&S technologies and the Army's 
organizational infrastructure to ascertain whether or not they 
adequately address cited goals. specifically, the 
programmatics of DoD's 5000 series are evaluated to see if 
they support the concurrent processes afforded by M&S. 
The research indicates that the Army should focus 
enhancing its requirements generation process by adequate l y 
supporting its Battle Labs. The degree to which M&S wil l 
impact the Army acquisition process is dependent on how well 
M&S and Battle Labs are represented in the Future Years 
Defense Plan. Recommendations in the areas of acquisit i on 
programma tics and Army organizat ional infrastructure are 
provided in an attempt to enhance the applicat i on of M&S in 
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The purpose of this thesis is to identify, describe, and 
analyze the potential capabilities and limitations of the 
modeling and simulation (M&S) strategy used by the U.s . Army 
for acquisition purposes. From the ana l ysis a set of 
recommendations in the a reas of acquisition progrommatics, 
technol ogy infrastructure, and organizational infrastructure 
are provided in an attempt to enhance t he application of M&S 
in the Army's acquisition process. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Modeling and simulation represents an explosive growth 
industry within the U.S. Defense Department. The technolog i es 
comprising these revolutionary techniques are receiving 
increasingly wider application among the Services, and in 
particular the Army, as the Department of Defense (000) budget 
continues to plummet. (Williams,~993,p.~6) 
As M&S capabilities increase, and the amount of defense 
spending decreases, M&'S surfaces as a more critical aspect of 
a weapon system's acquis ition strategy. This technology 
portends reduction of costly mistakes by allowing the Army to 
define and test its requirements very early in the acquisition 
cycle. 
Lieutenant General William H. Forster, the Military Deputy 
to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development 
and Acquisition), reinforced the need for M&S integration into 
the Army acquisition process. In his 24 May 1993 Memorandum 
for the Deputy commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
and all Program Executive Officers, under the subject of 
"Simulation Support to the Army", LTG Forster states: 
The Army Science Board and Defense Science Board have 
recently studied the potential improvements to 000 
acquisition offered by advanced simulation, particularly 
Distributed Interactive simulation (DIS). Both concluded 
that simulation can improve acquisition from concept to 
fielding through such innovations as: virtual 
prototyping; engineering simulation; linking of 
constructive, virtual and/or live simulations; assisting 
the user in execution of experiments in employment 
tactics; user test design and critical issue 
identification; and improved training prior to fielding. 
The Army is leading the way for 000 in simulation with 
such initiatives as Battlefield Distributed Simulation-
Developmental, Close combat Tactical Trainer, and DIS 
Modernization and Master Plans. We need to take full 
advantage from concept to fielding. Effective second 
quarter fiscal year 1994, all Army acquisition strategies 
for Acquisition Category I and II programs will include a 
simulation support plan. Additionally, the simulation 
support plan must be included in the Program Manager's 
ASARC briefing. Other programs may be tasked by the Army 
Acquisition Executive to include a simulation support 
plan. (Forster, 1993 ,p.l) 
Simulation technologies as evidenced by LTG Forster's 
comments are the focal point of intensive research. Advances 
are rapidly unfolding in this arena and Pentagon interest, 
which usually translates into increasing funding, is regarded 
as intense. Experts point to the absolute necessity of 
developing and fielding an improved M&S architecture for 
readiness, operations and acquisition. (Williams,1993,p.16) 
The Army's M&S resources have been predominantly used in 
the areas of training and analysis. The Army has increased 
the capability of its high resolution modeling facilities and 
is making dramatic progress in the area of three dimensional 
simulation. These advancements have generated high 
expectations that within the next few years the M&S community 
will field the requisite fidelity and distributed capabilities 
needed to streamline the current acquisition process. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis considers the Army's current acquisition 
process, M&S technologies and the Army's organizational 
infrastructure to ascert~in whether or not they adequately 
address cited goals. Specifically, the programmatics of DoD's 
5000 series, which addresses the policies and procedures for 
DoD and Army acquisition, are evaluated to see if they support 
the concurrent processes afforded by M&S. Secondly, the near, 
mid, and long range capabilities of the Army's M&S 
technologies are assessed to ascertain what level of 
confidence acquisition professionals and 000 leaders should 
place in these assets. Finally, the Army's current 
organizational structure is evaluated to determine whether it 
can facilitate the successful implementation of M&S technology 
for acquisition streamlining. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: 
• What constructs can be formulated which enable modeling 
and simulation to impact beneficially on the Army 
acquisition process? 
The three subsidiary questions are: 
• Does the 000 5000 series support the vision of stre-amlined 
acquisition through the use of modeling and simulation? 
• Can this vision of increased use of modeling and 
simulation, within the Army acquisition process, be 
supported by the current allotment of Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding? 
• Does the Army's organizational structure maximize the 
potential of modeling and simUlation on the acquisition 
process? 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Three major areas are analyzed to determine the best 
method, and potential pitfalls, of integrating current and 
future M&S capabilities into the Army's acquisition 
architecture. They are: acquisition prograrnmatics; Army 
acquisition organizational structure; and the Army's M&S 
technology infrastrUcture. All three represent critical and 
interdependent portions of the acquisition process that must 
be evaluated if the objective of acquisition streamlining is 
to be met. 
A major portion of the thesis concentrates on the 
applicability of the current 000 5000 series regulating U.S. 
Defense acquisition. While the 000 5000 series covers all 
four Services' acquisition policy this paper focuses solely on 
its impacts within the U.S. Army. 
The M&S strategy presented includes most major M&S 
programs ongoing at the time this document was written but is 
not inclusive of all technologies residing within the M&S 
architecture. The programs mentioned do, however, cover 
technologies from the major areas within the M&S cor.ununity to 
provide the reader an appreciation for the capabilities 
derived from the integration of these assets. 
organizational issues discussed are limited to the Major 
Commands or Offices within the Department of the Army that 
deal directly, or primarily, with Army acquisition policy and 
issues. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
Research data were obtained from professional materials, 
articles, previous theses, 000 and Army manuals and briefings, 
and personal interviews. Information on current M&S programs 
was obtained from various Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) Analysis Centers (TRACs), the Institute for 
simulation and Training at the University of Central Florida, 
the Army's Simulation, Training and Instrumentation Command 
(STRICOM), the Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM) I and 
the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO). 
Most of the research was conducted during on-site visits 
or telephone interviews. The major thrusts of questions asked 
focused on whether the Army is postured in terms of policy, 
technology, funding and organizational structure to advantage 
the capabilities of current and forthcoming M&S potential. In 
addition, the DoD 5000 series and the Army acquisition 
organizational structure were examined to determine whether or 
not their architecture would house the future methods of 
conducting acquisition business. The final area of analysis 
focused on the RDT&E funding levels provided for Army M&S to 
see if this wou ld afford the realization of the Army's M&S 
vision. 
G. ACRONYMS 
As with most military topics M&S has established its own 
vocabulary of acronyms. The list of these terms is quite 
extensive and contained in Appendix A. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II of this thesis addresses the recent 
administrative and political events that have shaped the 
Army's current acquisition strategy. Chapter III discusses 
acquisition prograTIlJllatics such as the 000 5000 series, the 
acquisition life cycle model, and the RDT&E funding 
requirements, then reviews the organizational structure that 
supports the Army acquisition process. Chapter IV takes an 
in-depth look at the Army's M&S strategy and the associate 
driving technologies. Chapters V and VI contain the 
information analysis, and the conclusions and recommendations, 
respectively. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF TODAY'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
A. GENERAL 
Over the past 30 years the Federal Government has sought 
to provide the military with a strategy that would optimize 
the acquisition process. These major acquisition reforms 
sought to reduce cost and schedule overruns, increase program 
stability, emphasize realistic testing, and improve the 
efficiency of the acquisition process. The following 
initiatives, which date back to the McNamara era of the early 
1960' s have all had one common underlying theme - reduce cost 
and schedule overruns while enhancing system performance: 
• McNamara Initiatives (1961) 
• Cotnlllission on Government Procurement (1972) 
• Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 (1976) 
• Defense Science Board Acquisition cyc l e Study (1978) 
• Defense Resource Management Study (1979) 
• Defense Acquisition Improvement Program (1981) 
• Grace Commission (1983) 
• Packard "Blue Ribbon" commission (1986) 
• Goldwater - Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986) 
• Defense Management Review (1989) (GAO,1992,p.53) 
with so much emphasis over the years on acquisition 
process and strategy it seems inconceivable to still encounter 
program debacles such as the B-1 Bomber, the C-17 Cargo 
Aircraft, and the 1'.-12 Attack Aircraft. Yet to this very day 
cost and schedule overruns and failure to meet user 
requirements still haunt many program mangers. 
The 1992 GAO report on "Weapons Acquisition - A Rare 
opportunity for Lasting Change", states that, "We believe that 
past acquisition reforms have had limited effectiveness 
because they have not changed the basic incentives or 
pressures that drive the behavior of the participants of the 
process". (GAO,1992,p.53) 
Ironically, in the pursuit of a more perfect acquisition 
process, it was the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet union that provided the catalyst for the current round 
of acquisition revisions. In his 20 May 1992 Memorandum to 
the Secretaries of t h e Military Departments, on the subject of 
Defense Acquisition. Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Don Yockey stated: 
with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of 
the Soviet union, the pressure of rapidly advancing high 
technology weapons in the arsenals of potential enemies 
has also significantly lessened. Consequently, the need 
to replace existing weapon systems in order to mainta in a 
significant technological advantage is no longer as 
urgent. As a result, we will be able to reduce 
concurrency in development programs and retain existing 
equipment for longer periods, with the necessary 
technological advances incorporated more often through 
upgrades than through initiation of new systems. The 
reduced urgency for modernization, coupled with the 
smaller armed forces, means the Department will acquire 
fewer weapons systems and that the acquisition budget will 
be reduced accordingly. 
Although we will reduce the quantity of new weapons 
produced, the need to maintain technological superiority, 
a key combat force multiplier, will drive us to increase 
efforts in developing new and innovative technology. 
There are seven areas (Seven Science and Technology 
Thrusts) i n the expanded Science and Technology (S&T) 
Program which provide a focus for the development of new 
and promising ideas, including those related to 
manufacturing processes. Additional funding allocated to 
the seven areas will provide the opportunity for the best 
of these ideas to be proven in Advanced Technology 
Demonstrations (ATDs). These ATDs will be focused on 
validating the maturity and utility of advanced 
technologies and will, thereby, reduce performance, cost, 
and schedule risks in future acquisiti on programs. 
(Yockey ,1992, p.1) 
B. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY THRUSTS 
To provide the focus for the S&T program, seven broad 
areas of capability have to be defined. These Seven Thrusts 
represent the current assessment of the areas on which the S&T 
program should be focussed to address the users' most pressing 
military and operational needs. While there are goals and 
activities in the S&T program which fall outside of these 
thrusts, it is crucial to the maintenance of our technological 
superiority that our investments and energies be focused on 
those efforts which are the most important to -- which show 
the greatest promise for improving -- future military 
capabilities. (Charles, WP#3 ,1992, p. 2) 
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The Seven Thrusts are: 
l. Globa l Surveillance and Communications. To project 
power requires a global surveil l ance and communications 
capability that can focus on a trouble spot, surge in 
capaci ty, and be responsive to the needs of the commander. 
2. Precision strike. The goals of increasing the 
effectiveness of weapons and reducing casualties, while 
using fewer weapons platforms, demand that we locate high-
value, t i me-sens i tive fixed and mobi le targets and destroy 
them with a high degree of confidence. 
3. Air superiority and Defense. The need to defend 
deployed mil i tary forces from ballistic and cruise missiles 
and to maintain our current decisive capabilities in air 
combat, interdiction, and close air support requires a 
focussed effort in missi l e defense and air superiority. 
4. Sea Control and Undersea Superiorit y. To maintain an 
overseas presence, conduct forcible entry and naval 
interdiction operations, and operate in littoral zones 
requires superiority in sea contro l and undersea warfare. 
5. Advanced Land Combat. The abilit y to rapid l y deploy our 
ground forces to a region, exercise a high degree of 
tactical mobi lity, and neutralize the enemy quickly and 
with minimal casualties in the presence of a heavy armored 
threat and smart weaponry requires highly capable and 
survivable land combat systems. 
6. synthetic Environments. A broad range of information 
and human interaction techno l ogies must be developed to 
synthesize present and future battlefields, identify 
critical problem areas, and speed the development of cost-
effective solutions. synthetic battlefields will involve 
a mix of real and computer-simul ated equipment. Integrated 
teams of users, developers, and/or testers will be able to 
interact effectively. synthetic environments will prepare 
our leaders and forces for war. 
7. Techno l ogy for Affordabil i t v. Techno l ogies that will 
reduce unit and life cycle costs are essential to achieving 
significant performance and affordability i mprOVements. 
Advances are particularly needed in technologies to support 
integrated product and process design, flexible 
manufactur i ng systems that separate cost from volume, 
enterprise-wide information systems that improve program 
control and reduce overhead cost, and integrated software 
engineering environments. (Charles, WP#3, ~992, p. 4) 
M&S potential has the recognition of senior civilian and 
military leaders. With their attention, acquisition 
streaml ining can be accomplished through the continued 
implementation and integration of current M&S technologies as 
researchers continue to develop S&T thrust areas six and 
From wi thin each of these thrust areas Advanced Technology 
Demonstrations (ATDs) will be developed. The critical 
challenge will be to maintain the scientific and technologica l 
continuity as findings are transferred from basic research to 
exploratory deve lopment. It is also imperative that the 
warfighter be directly involved in this process so that the 
system requirements for the user are identified early in the 
acquisition process. 
C. ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS 
Advanced technology demonstration efforts are structured 
to develop and integrate hardware for field experiments and 
tests; this is the demonstration phase of S&T. Candidates 
include those that have successfully transitioned from 
research and exploratory development and those which may have 
evolved from independent industry or other efforts. The ATD 
program provides funding to develop and fabricate hardware and 
software to evaluate performance, military utility, and 
affordability issues. (Charles,wP#4,1992,p.3) 
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There are generally two types of ATDs: those focused on 
new system and subsystem concepts and those focused on 
"enabling" technologies. Demonstrations of capability, 
coupled with simulation and exercises, will help ensure that 
the technology is ready and affordable, manufacturing 
processes are available, and operating concepts are understood 
before committing to a formal acquisition program. What is 
new is the scope and depth of ATDs and the increased 
importance of their role in the acquisition process, and the 
emphasis on user involvement to permit an early and meaningfUl 
evaluation of military capability . (Charles,WP#3,~992,p.2) 
The distinction between ATDs and acquisition programs is 
eXplained as follows: ATDs are part of the science and 
technology base , focused on validating viability and 
producibility of technology. Acquisition programs are only 
undertaken when there is a clear military need, technologies 
have been demonstrated and tested, and the new system or 
upgrade is cost-effective . Further, before technologies from 
science and technology projects transition to a formal 
acquisition program, the mission need must have been validated 
and approved at Milestone o. (Cochrane,August,~992,p.43) 
The purpose of the SST and ATD programs is to provide for 
the availability and integration of advanced technology to 
meet military needs. The S&T/ATD strategy emphasizes meeting 
the needs of the fighting forces while at the same time making 
available new technologies to meet pressing operational 
13 
problems. This strategy is structured to focus the S&T 
program in order to maintain a position of technological 
superiority that is essential for the success of America's 
military forces. (Charles,WP#3,l992,p.l7) 
D. FORKER SECRETARY ASPIN'S ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
Former Secretary of Defense Aspin's "New Acquisition 
strategy" deviated little from Mr Yockey's. Aspin's policy 
called for: 
• Increased research on advanced technologies 
• Increased development and evaluation of ATDs 
• ATDs that will lead to upgrades to current systems or new 
capabilities that will be put into system development and 
production 
• A strategy that is coupled to the existing DoD system as 
defined in DoDD SOOO.l/DoDI 5000.2 (Aspin,l993,p.l) 
The primary objective of Aspin's acquisition strategy is 
to effect the successful transition of technology to 
operational utility. This has been an area that the U.S. has 
been traditionally weak in and where the proper integration of 
M&S technologies will pay tremendous dividends in lending both 
solutions and continuity. (OTA, 1989, p. 53) 
Aspin seems to be very attuned to this fact and the 
capabilities of M&S. He feels that the demonstrations of 
capability, coupled with advanced simUlation techniques, will 
lead to a comprehensive assessment of: 
• Technical feasibility (will it/does it work?) 
• Affordability (is it cost effective/can we afford it?) 
• Operational utility (does it meet a valid combat need?) 
(Aspin, 1993 ,p. 3) 
The transition from S£T Thrusts to ATDs to weapon systems 
production appears to be the direct ion of 000 and the Army' 5 
acquisition process. Subsequent chapters of this thesis 
address how the integrati on of M&S technologies, within the 
appropriate vehicle, can facilitate the transfer of technology 
from SST Thrusts, to weapon system utilization, in the most 
eft icient and cost effective manner. 
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III. ACQUISITION PROGRAMMATICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
A. OVERVIEW 
Colleen A. Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Reform, made the following proclamation in her 
Proposed strategic Plan to Pursue Acquisition Reform; 
The Department of Defense faces an unprecedented challenge 
in preserving force effectiveness in the light of the 
radically altered and ever changing threat. To ensure, as 
the President and Secretary of Defense have committed, 
that we will not have a 'hollow force', but will maintain 
the edge we have over opponents in terms of quality of 
people, training, and technology, will not be easy. 
Maintaining readiness and protecting our technological 
superiority in today's environment means we must protect 
funding in the readiness accounts and for the science and 
technology programs. 
To pay for these priorities in a declining defense budget 
we must make major reductions in our other accounts, 
including our modernization accounts, and, we must find 
ways to dramatically reduce our ' infrastructure' or cost 
of doing business. That I infrastructure' includes a 
number of functions and areas that must be addressed. One 
of those is the acquisition structure that has evolved 
over the years, but is no longer responsive to today's 
needs. 
We have today an acquisition system that evolved through 
the adoption of a myriad of rules, regulations, and laws 
that were intended to address a particular problem or 
public interest. The combined net effect of those rules, 
regulations, and laws is a system whose costs exceed any 
demonstrable benefit. In addition, these rules and 
regulations add costs to products of defense contractors, 
preventing them from being competitive in the commercial 
marketplace, and prevent commercial contractors unwilling 
to change their ways from selling to the government. In 
the past we could rely on incremental imprOVements to the 
system. To meet today's challenges we must revolutionize 
the process. (Preston,1993,p.3) 
What is it about the DoD's acquisition process that seems 
to make it so inapplicable to today's requirements? To simply 
say that the entire process is broken lends little to 
providing a solution. This chapter addresses current 
acquisition programrnatics and organizational structure to 
determine how it facilitates today's acquisition process. 
This review will lay the foundation for the analysis in 
Chapter V which will identify what is still relevant, 
obsolete, within the acquisition process and community to 
evaluate how the Army's M&S assets generate a more 
streamlined acquisition process. 
B. DOD 5000 SERIES 
The 000 "5000 series" is comprised of the following three 
documents. The 000 Directive 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition"; 
000 Instruction 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Management 
Policies and Procedures"; and 000 Manual SOOO.2M, "Defense 
Acquisition Management Documents and Reports", all dated 23 
February 1991. This new 5000 series provides a single uniform 
acquisition system for all 000 acquisition programs including: 
Major defense acquisition programs, non-major defense 
acquisition programs, and highly sensitive classified 
programs. This is an attempt to forge an interf.ace among the 
requirements generation system, the acquisition management 
system, and the planning, programMing and bUdgeting system 
(PPBS). The 5000 series contends that these three major 
decision-making support systems must interface effectively for 
the acquisition process to work (Figure 1). (Cochrane,May-
June,1992,p.29) 
DECISION-MAKING SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
Effective Interaetion 
Figure 1 Decision Making Support Systems 
l. Decision-Making Support System 
As noted before, the authors of the 5000 series felt 
it imperative that the three major decision-making support 
systems interface effectively for the acqUisition process to 
function as designed_ It is worthwhile to examine each of 
these support systems to reveal what each is responsible for 
and how they relate to one another. 
a. Requirements Generation System 
Requirements generation is based on a continuing 
process of assessing the capabilities of the current force 
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structure (people and materiel) to meet the projected threat, 
while taking into account opportunities for technological 
advancement, cost savings, and changes in national policy or 
doctrine. The output of this process, known as mission area 
analysis (MAA), is a deficiency, or a mismatch between current 
capabilities and the projected threat. Once identified, 
deficiencies need to be resolved, and the first choice is a 
change in organization, doctrine or tactics, or perhaps 
additional training. These alternatives, often called non-
materiel alternatives, are investigated first because of their 
relatively low cost and ease of implementation. Should non-
materiel alternatives prove incapable of resolving the 
deficiency, we then proceed to look for materiel solutions. 
Once a determination is made that a materiel solution is 
required to satisfy the deficiency, a Mission Need statement 
(MNS) documents the deficiency in the operational capability, 
not in system specific terms. (Schmoll,1993,p.21) 
The MNS includes the applicable Defense Guidance 
element, the threat, the mission role of the system, any 
optional concepts, cooperative opportunities, technologies 
involved, funding aspects and implications, possible 
constraints, and the acquisition strategy. It is one of many 
documents prepared for Milestone I review. 
Milestone I approval requires several documents, of 
which the most important programmatically are the operational 
Requirements Document (ORD), the Test and Evaluation Master 
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Plan (TEMP), and the Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA). 
The ORO details the performance and related 
operational parameters for the concept or system proposed in 
meeting the deficiencies addressed in the MNS. It establishes 
the minimum acceptable requirements for the concept or system. 
The TEMP documents the test and evaluation strategy, 
objectives, schedule, and required resources of effort in 
order to verify that the performance requirements established 
by the ORO will be met. The COEA is a stand alone report, 
unique, separate from, but consistent with, other analytic. 1 
efforts supporting defense acquisition management. The COE1\. 
is structured to define cost, military capabilities and 
operational benefits associated with principal materiel 
alternatives that address validated mission needs. Once 
issued the ORO, the TEMP, and the COE1\. become continuing 
documents requiring updating and approval at each milestone, 
and in effect are the primary documents for exerting 
service/DoD control over the program. (Blanchard, 1990, p. 23) 
b. Acquisi tion Management System 
The acquisition management system is designed to 
provide for a streamlined acquisition management structure and 
an event-driven acquisition process that eXplicitly links 
milestone decisions to demonstrated accomplishments. This 
process provides the basis for making informed trade-off 
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decisions, given affordability constraints and the user's 
needs. It also represents the means for translating the 
user's needs into alternative concepts and, ultimately, a 
stable system design. (DoDD5000.1,1991,p.2) 
Figure 2 illustra tes the sequential nat ure of this 
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Figure 2 Milestones and Phases 
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M 
process followed by a "condensed DoDD 5000.1" description of 
what is entailed within each milestone and phase. 
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(1) Determination of Mission Need. All acquisition 
programs are based on identified mission needs. These needs 
are generated as a direct result of continuing assessments of 
current and projected capabilities in the context of changing 
military threats and national defense policy. 
(2) Milestone 0 - concept studies Approval. Mile-
stone 0 marks the initia l formal interface between the 
requirements generation and the acquisition :management system. 
The milestone decision authority decides what action should be 
taken on the MNS at this decision point. For those MNS 
receiving favorable consideration, the milestone decision 
authority authorizes studies of a minimum set of materiel 
alternative concepts. A decision to proceed at this point 
does not establish a new acquisition program. Instead, it 
merely reflects approval to proceed with studies of 
alternative concepts that could satisfy the identified :mission 
need. 
(3) Phase 0 - Concept Exploration and Definition. 
Competitive, parallel, short term studies by the Government 
and/or industry will normally be used dUring this phase. The 
focus is on defining and evaluating the feasibility of 
alternative concepts and providing the basis for assessing the 
relative merits of the concepts at the Milestone I, Concept 
Demonstration Approval, decision point. The COEA is most 
instrumental in this decision making process and in any 
subsequent awards to industry. 
(4) Milestone I - Concept Demonstration Approval. 
Milestone decision authorities must assess the affordability 
of a new acquisition program at Milestone I. This decision 
marks the first direct interaction between the planning, 
programming, and budgeting and acquisition management systems. 
A favorable decision at Milestone I establishes a new 
acquisition program and a Concept Baseline, containing initial 
program cost, schedule, and performance objectives for the new 
program and authorizes entry into Phase I. 'The program 
management office will be established and the program manager 
assigned within 6 months of a favorable decision. 
(5) Phase I - Demonstration and Validation. When 
warranted, multiple design approaches and parallel 
technologies are pursued within the system concept(s) during 
this phase. Supportability and manufacturing process design 
considerations must be integrated into the system design 
effort early to preclude costly redesign efforts downstream in 
the process. Prototyping, testing, and early operational 
assessment of critical systems, subsystems, and components 
will be emphasized. This is essential to identify and reduce 
risk as well as assessing if the most promising design 
approach (es) will operate in the intended operational 
environment. 
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(6) Milestone II - Development Approval. The 
objectives of Milestone II are to determine if the results of 
Phase I warrant continuation and to assess the affordability 
of the program by establishing a Development Baseline. This 
baseline contains refined program costs, schedule, and 
performance obj ectives for program approved for 
continuation. Establishing the Development Baseline requires 
effective interaction among the requirements generation, 
acquisition management, and the planning, programming, and 
budgeting systems. Development approval will typically 
involve a commitment to low-rate initial production. The 
determination of the low-rate initial production quantity to 
be procured before completion of initial operational test and 
evaluation shall be made by the milestone decision authority 
at Mi lestone II in consultation with the Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation. 
(7) Phase II - Engineering and Manllfactllring 
Development. The objectives of Phase II are to translate the 
most promising design approach developed in Phase I into a 
stable, producible and cost effective system design. This is 
accomplished by validating the manufacturing or production 
process and demonstration through testing that the system 
capabilities, both, meet contract specification requirements, 
and, satisfies the mission need established in the operational 
performance requirements. 
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(8) Milestone III Production Approval. A 
favorable decision at this point represents a commitment to 
build, deploy, and support the system. Milestone decision 
authorities must confirm the affordabi l ity of the proposed 
program and determine that the materi el item is approved for 
Service use as part of the production approval process. It 
must also be ensured that the design is stable and producible 
and that production processes have been validated so that a 
realistic Production Baseline can be established. Particular 
attention must be placed on assessing devel opmental and 
operational test and evaluation results, establishing the most 
economic production rate that can be sustained, identifying 
the criteria to be used to declare when operational capability 
is attained, and ensuring that planning for deployment and 
support is compl ete and adequate. 
(9) Phase III - Production and Deployment. Phase 
III objectives are to establish a stable, efficient production 
and support base, achieve an operationa l capability that 
satisfies the mission need, and conduct follow-on operational 
and production verification testing. These tests are designed 
to confirm system performance and quality and to verify the 
correction of previously noted deficiencies. The results of 
field experience to include operational readiness rates will 
be continuously monitored to assess the ability of the system 
to perform as intended, identify and incorporate into 
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production lots minor engineering change proposals , and 
evaluate the need for major upgrades or modifications that 
require a Milestone IV, Major Modification Approval, review. 
(10) Milestone IV - Major Modification Approval 
(as required). The objective of Milestone IV is to determine 
if major upgrades to a system currently in production are 
warranted, and if so, establish an approved acquisition 
strategy and baseline (Concept, Development, or Production) 
for the program. When a system is no longer in production, a 
deficiency resulting from a change in threat, defense policy, 
or technology must be def ined in a new MNS. The intent is 
that potential systems modifications should compete with all 
other possible alternatives during a new Phase O. 
(11) Phase IV - operations and Support. This 
phase overlaps with Phase III. It begins after the initial 
systems have been fielded. The main objectives of Phase IV 
are to ensure the fielded system continues to provide the 
capabilities required to meet the i dentified mission need and 
to identify shortcomings or deficiencies that must be 
corrected to improve performance. Quality and safety problems 
wi ll be corrected as identified during this phase. 
c. Planning, ProgramJIJing & Budgeting System 
The Defense Systems Management college's 
"Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management" describes the 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as: 
The PPBS is the official management system which 
ultimately produces DoD's portion of the President's 
budget. It is unique to 000 and was originally i ntroduced 
to the Department by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
in 1962. The PPBS is a cyclic process with three distinct 
but interrelated phases, Planning, Programming and 
Budget i ng. It provides a formal, systematic structure for 
making decisions on policy, strategy and the development 
of forces and capabilities to accomplish anticipated 
missions . The PPBS provides for the time-phased 
allocation of resources and submission of supporting 
documentation . Its objective is to provide operational 
commanders with the best mix of forces and support in view 
of real fiscal constraints. (Schmoll,1993,p.29) 
Until 1986, the FPBS was an annual process through 
which DoD prepared its annual budget. Beginning in 1987 with 
the submission of the first 2-year defense budget (for fiscal 
years 1988-1989), PPBS itself became a biennial procedure. A 
comp lete PPBS cycle takes 24 months (February of year 1 to 
February of year 3). The PPBS also results in periodic 
updates (at least twice annua lly) to the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP). The FYDP reflects requirements for the 
out years based on DoD planning to meet national defense 
objectives. A brief description of each of the segments of 
the Planning, Programming and BUdgeting Systems follows. 
Planning is the responsibility of the Under 
secretary of Defense for Policy. The planning phase is 9 
months long, s tarting in February of each odd-numbered 
calendar year (the "off year" for programming and bUdgeting) 
and ending in October with the publication of the Defense 
Planning Guide (DPG). 
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Programming is managed by the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation. It is the 
bridge between planning (with broad fiscal guidance) and 
budgeting (wh ich meticul ously prices each program element). 
It begins with the issuing of the draft DPG in August of each 
odd-numbered calendar year and ends with the submission of the 
service and defense agency Program objective Memoranda (POMs) 
in April of each even-numbered calendar year . 
Budgeting is the respons ibility of the 
Comptro l ler. Based on OSD review/comment on the POMs, Budget 
Estimate Submissions are prepared and forwarded (in September 
of the even-numbered calendar years) to OSD by the military 
departments and defense agencies . Service and defense agency 
budgets are reviewed and the fina l 000 budget then goes to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to be incorporated into 
the President's budget submission to Congress, thus ending the 
budgeting phase. (Schmoll,J.993,p.30) 
RDTIiE FUNDING 
The Research and Development portion of the 000 budget, 
referred to as Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) constitutes Category 6 of the DoD budget, and is 
subdivided follows: Research, 6. J.; Exp l oratory 
Development, 6.2; Advanced Development, 6.3 (broken down 
further into 6.3A, advanced development prior to the 
development of specific systems, and 6.38 which focuses on 
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specific systems} i Engineering Development, 6.4; Management 
and Support, 6.5 i and Operations Systems Development. 6.6. 
This organization reflects emphasizing a progression from 
basic research through various stages of development of the 
final product. New concepts are researched at the 6.~ l evel, 
and if proven, advance to the 6 . 2 level, where the research is 
applied to a prel i minary laboratory device. If the 6.2 
criteria are satisfied, the program proceeds to the 6.3 l evel, 
where the technology goes through Advanced Technology 
Demonstrations and/or the demonstration and validation phase. 
If warranted, during this phase, prototypes are developed for 
further testing and evaluation. Finally, in 6.4, programs 
successful in demonstration and validation are redesigned for 
production, should the need be required. operational Systems 
Development funds, 6.6, are used for developing improvements 
to the system during production phase and after it is fielded. 
The Management and Support funds, 6.5, cover the overhead 
activi ties throughout the R&D process. (Nunno, 1992, pg .1) 
Figure 3 is a functional view of the RDT&E process in 
terms of five sequential phases. The first two blocks, 
Research and Exploratory Development, constitute the 
Technology Base. Combined with part of the third block, 
Advanced Technology Development, 6.3A, they represent the DoD 
and Army Science and Technology effort. The remainder of the 
third block, 6.3B, by far the larger part of Advanced 
Development, represents the development effort toward 
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Demonstration and Validation of concept and system 
feasibility. The fourth block represents Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development and operational Systems leading to 
the fifth block, Production and Deployment, the fielding of 
RDT&E BREAKOUT 
I I I 
Figure 3 RDT&E Functional Flow 
the system to provide mission capability needs of the Army. 
The lines linking each block emphasize that the RDT&E process 
is not ,it simple linear progression, but rather involves much 
iteration and feedback. (DoN RD&A Guide,1993,Pg.2) 
D. ACQUISITION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Another key element to the success or failure of an 
acquisition strategy is its organizational structure. It is 
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imperative that each organization be funded, resourced and 
staffed with the appropriate assets in order to achieve the 
maximum capability that simulation has to offer. Figure 4 
depicts the acquisition related organizations that will be 
Figure 4 Army Acquisition organizational structure 
addressed in this document. The basic functions and 
responsibilities of each will be described in the following 
paragraphs. In Chapter V these organizations will be analyzed 
to determine whether the current allocation of a ssets and 
resources for these entities support the effective application 
of modeling and simulation technology. 
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1. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations 
Research) (DUSA(OR)) 
The DUSA(OR) reports directly to the secretary of the 
Army for the following: 
• Managing the Army study Program, the Model Improvement 
Program, and the SimUlation Technology Program. 
Establishing policy for operations research and systems 
analysis activities for the Department of the Army 
analytical support services. 
supporting the Army Systems Acquisition Review council, 
Defense Acquisition Board, and similar systems acquisition 
review committees. 
• Providing policy and program direction for the Army 
Officer operations Research Education Program. 
• Approving test-related documentation for the Department of 
the Army and forwarding it to the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. 
• Serving as the principal Department of the Army interface 
with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and 
the Director, Defense operational Test and Evaluation. 
• Providing policy and oversight for the Anny contracted 
Advisory and Assistance Services. 
2. Assistant secretary of The Army - Research, 
Development oS: Acquisition (ASA(RDA)) 
The Assistant secretary of the Anny (Research, 
Development & Acquisition) serves as the Army Acquisition 
Executive (ME), the Senior Procurement Executive, the Science 
Advisor to the Secretary, and serves as the senior research 
and development off icial for the Department of the Anny. The 
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ASA(RDA) is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and 
responsive to the Chief of Staff, Army. The ASA (RDA) is 
assisted by a Military Deputy (MILDEP) who is also the 
Director, Acquisition Career Management (OACM). 
Some of the major responsibilities that the ASA(RDA) 
and the ME have that directly relate to this thesis are: 
• Managing the acquisition programs of the Army in 
accordance with established DoD policies and guidelines. 
• Establishing a streamlined acquisi tion structure for 
managing Army acquisition programs. 
• Designating the Army command or agency responsible for 
performing system engineering trade-off analyses for the 
cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEAl, and 
provide issues, alternatives, and broad guidance for 
DCSOPS inclusion in the CORA tasking document. 
• Reviewing and approving the Army position at each decision 
milestone before the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
review. 
• Representing the Army on the DAB. 
• Developing, implementing, and moni toring the Science and 
Technology Information Program. 
• Developing materiel systems acqui sition pol icy. 
• Managing the Army Research, Deve l opment, Test and 
Evaluation, and procurement appropriations. 
• Managing the transition from development to production, to 
include Production Readiness Reviews . 
3. Deputy Assist~nt secret~ry for Research ~nd Techno~ogy 
The Deputy Assistant secretary for Research and 
Technology reports directly to the ASA(RDA) and his major 
responsibilities include: 
• Acting as the Army S&T Executive and a member of the 
Defense S&T Working Group. 
• Planning and implementing 6.1 through 6 . 3A RDT&E 
expenditures in support of the Army's S&T Base. 
• setting policy and issuing guidance to improve Army 
Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) and 
laboratory management. 
• Approving S&T acquisition plans. 
• setting policy and issuing guidance for Independent 
Research and Development, Sma l l Business Innovative 
Research and Advanced Concepts Technology Programs. 
• Managing the Army Science Board, Army Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers, National Academy of 
Sciences Board on Army Science and Technology. 
Setting policy, priorities, funding and issuing guidance 
for the Army In-House Laboratory Independent Research. 
Directing the Army Domestic Technology Transfer Program 
and S&T Information Program 
". Deputy for Systems Management 
The Deputy for Systems Management also reports to the 
ASA(RDA) and is responsible for executive program management 
oversight and implementation of acquisition policy for 
aviation, missile, ground combat, intelligence/electronic 
warfare, and special operations force acquisition programs. 
He is the direct link between the ME and assigned program 
PEGs and provides guidance, assistance, and direction. Much 
of the Deputy for Systems Management's power and 
responsibi l ity stems from fact that he controls and implements 
almost the entire 6.38 through 6_6 RDT&E budget for the Army. 
5. Operational Test and Evaluation COtmland (OPTEC) 
The operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC) 
was established 15 November 1990 by Secretary of the Army 
General Orders Number 6. It consists of the OPTEC 
Headquarters and Support Agencies, the Operational Evaluation 
Command (OEC) and the Test and Experimentation Command 
(TEXCOM). The new command consolidates the previous TRADOC 
Test and Experimentation Command (TEXCOM), the previous 
operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) , and the 
previous Acquisition and Development of Threat Simulators 
Activity (ADATS-A) into a single command. ADATS-A, renamed 
the operational Threat Support Activity (OTSA), and the Test 
and Evaluation Coordination Offices (TECOs), are incorporated 
within OPTEC Headquarters. OPTEC's mission is to conduct all 
user test and evaluation (except medical) for the Army. User 
T&E includes operational test and evaluation (OT&E) in support 
of the materiel acquisition process, and force development 
testing and experimentation (FOTE) , concept evaluation program 
(CEP) trials, and the Army part of joint test and evaluation 
(JT&E) . 
OPTEC, Figure 5, is a field operating agency of the 
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. In keeping with the 
Defense Directives, it reports the results of T&E through the 
Vice chief of Staff of the Army directly to the Army and 
Defense leadership. The main part of OPTEC's mission is the 
planning, conducting, and reporting of OT&E which has been 
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required by law since 1972. Additiona l ly, OPTEC conducts 




Figure 5 OPTEC organizat10nal structure 
doctrine, organizations, and materiel requirements. 
6. Army Materiel Commanc1 (AMC) 
The AMe Regulation 10-2 states that the mission of the 
Commanding Genera l , AMC, is to: 
• Perform assigned materiel and related functions comprising 
research and development; configuration management; 
product assurance; test and evaluation; scientific and 
technical information; integrated logistics support 
planning and execution; rationalization, standardization, 
and interoperability; acquisition; product improvement; 
industria l preparedness; production; maintenance; 
wholesale materiel requirements determination; packaging; 
and disposal . 
• Develop and provide, in response to the objectives and 
specific requirements established by the user community, 
materiel and related logistic services . 
• Command subordinate commands, installations and activities 
as assigned (Those entities that impact this thesis will 
be detailed below) . 
• Provide worldwide technical and professional guidance and 
assistance for planning and conducting logistics support 
of Army n ateriel. 
Figure 6 depicts the AMC subordinate units mentioned 
in bullet number 3. 
AMC 
F1qure 6 AMC organizational structure 
I ~ ",romoo JI ItESEAJ!Cfl. DIN AND ENGINEERING 
CENTERS (RDECs) 
a. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) 
AMSAA is the systems analysis and modeling activity 
reporting to the AMC Commander. As the independent 
developmental evaluator for Army materiel systems, 
responsibilities include participating in the concept 
exploration process by performing the following: 
• Evaluates all materie l acquisition programs and deployed 
systems. 
• Performs integrated logistic support program surveillance 
for Army materiel systems. 
• Conducts risk ana l y s is. 
• Prepares the developmental T&E portion of the TEMP in 
conjunction with the developmental tester. 
• Analyzes and evaluates developmental test data. 
• Conducts advanced technology demonstrations in assigned 
b. ArlIIy Research Laboratory (ARL) 
ARL is a new organization within AMC which consists 
of the seven laboratories which made up the former Army 
Laboratory Command. It combines the laboratories with 
additional selected technical base activities from other 
organizations within the Army. The ARL is responsible for 
overseeing and managing nearly 75 percent of the Army's 
technology base program. Its primary area of operation 
resides in the 6.1 and 6.2 areas of the RDT&E budget for 
technology development . The commanding officer of ARL reports 
to the commander of AMC. (Davey,1991,p.15) 
c. Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) 
TECOM is responsible to all subordinate agencies 
throughout AMC for the support, assistance, and oversight of 
developmental test and evaluation for each acquisition 
program. 
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d. Simula"tion, Training and Ins"trumen"ta"tion COmIlland 
(STRICOM) 
STRICOM, in addition to procuring simulators is the 
Army's technical agent for Distributed Interactive Simulation 
(DIS) development and network management. This inc l udes the 
Battlefield Distributed simUlation - Developmental (80S-D) 
network. 
e. COlIJJIlOdi ty COl!ll!lands 
Commodity Commands house the program executive 
officers and program managers responsible for the design, 
procurement, sustainment, and retirement for systems such as 
helicopters, tanks, missiles, etc... Examples of commodity 
commands are the Aviation and Troop Command, ATCOM; the Tank 
and Automotive Command, TACOM; and the Missile Command, MICOH. 
f. Research, Develop11lent and Engineering centers 
(RDECs) 
RDECs provide engineering support for production, 
systems and weapons improvement. They are responsible for 
technology demonstration and engineering and development 
activities that are system related. The centers are oriented 
toward the development of technology programs, leading to 
products and systems . These centers are the engineering arms 
of the Army's commodity commands. (DaveY,1991,p.6) 
7. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
TRADOC, Figure 7, is the Army's principal doctrine 
TRADOe 
Figure 7 TRADOe organizational structure 
developer, combat developer, training developer, and trainer. 
TRADoe: 
• Represents the user during all aspects of requi rement 
definition, system acquisition, and force development. 
• Defines Army organizational, leader development, training, 
and materiel operational requirements. 
• Analyzes and projects the future threat in coordination 
with other appropriate Army and 000 organizations. 
The acquisition related TRAOOC activities that will be 
addressed in this thesis are illust rated above. 
a. TRADOC Analysis center (TRAC) 
TRAC performs applied and developmental research in 
selected topical areas to advance Army warf ighting doctrine 
and analysis; leverage investments by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, OPTEC, Army Research Institute, and other 
government organizations into TRAC, TRADOC, and the Army. 
b. TRADOC Proponent Centers and Schools 
TRADOC proponent centers and schools represent the 
individual branches within the Army (Aviation, Infantry, 
Transportation, etc •. ) in identifying, and recommending 
solutions for, mission need and mission area deficiencies. 
They prepare and execute the required training that is unique 
for their particular branch and submit long-range 
modernization plans through TRADOC to the Assistant Deputy 
Chief of staff - Force Development for prioritization within 
the Army in support of the Program Objective Memorandum. 
(1) Combat Developments. Combat Developments is 
the user's organization that performs the studies, analysis, 
and support required to identify, and provide solutions for, 
mission need and mission area deficiencies. Combat 
developments are generally comprised of the following 
divisions to contribute to these efforts! concepts and 
studies; simUlations and scenarios; organization and force 
development; and materiel, logistics and support. 
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(2) TRADOC system Manager (TSM). The TSM is the 
branch and user's representative for a particular system 
responsible for dealing with all branch external entities to 
include the system program manager's office, industry, 
Department of the Army and DoD staffs, and Congress. The TSM 
is the equivalent rank as their program manager counterpart. 
The TSM office is located at the appr opriate proponent center. 
c. Battle Labs 
The Battle Lab network is illustrated in Figure 8. 
BATTLE LABS 
Figure 8 Battle Lab Network 
Its concept and progress to date are covered in detail in 
Chapter IV, Section C. 
s. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations - Force 
Development (ADCSOPS-FD) 
The ADCSOPS-FD consolidates the individual system 
prioritization request of each branch of the Army and 
generates a master prioritization list for the Army as a 
whole. This priority list is used for selecting the Arnly's 
"silver bullets" in terms of funding and congressional 
support. He must work closely with the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Research and Technology and the Deputy for 
Systems Management to ensure his actions are in concert with 
the ongoing developments in the RDT&E structure. 
IV. TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. GENERAL 
The Army, through TRADOC, is developing "Battle Labs" at 
its primary combat development laboratories. Additionally, 
the Army is intent on integrating operationally oriented 
"virtual" simulation networks with high resolution 
"constructive" models. The potential advantages of 
integrating these simulation capabilities throughout the 
acquisition process are numerous, but limited mainly by the 
Army's ability to understand, access and integrate these 
emerging technologies. 
This chapter defines these simulation and modeling 
technologies, introduces the Army's Battle Lab Network, and 
illustrates how the Chief of staff of the Army plans to 
exploit this M&S capability through a series of virtual 
exercises called Louisiana Maneuvers. 
TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
The Army's mission is power projection in defense of 
national interest. The necessary reshaping of the Army, in 
the face of reductions in dollars and people, requires a new 
reliance on technology and a new technology strategy. This 
strategy is based on a decrease in large procurements and an 
increase in upgrades of existing systems by inserting new 
technology. (Battle Labs Guide (BLG) ,1993,p.2) 
The Army technology strategy includes pursuing the most 
cost effective advanced technologies to the 
technological edge. Simul taneously, cycle time from 
laboratory to production must be reduced; otherwise the 
advantage of developing a leading edge technology is 
jeopardized. Distributed Interactive Simulation and Advanced 
Technology Demonstrations will be used extensively to improve 
the definition of weapon system requirements. (Vaden, 1993, p. B) 
Experience shows that, at the transition from technology 
development to the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase, at milestone II, only about 10 percent of the system's 
life cycle cost have been spent. However, at milestone II, 
decisions have been made that predetermine as much as 90 
percent of the system's life cycle costs. The recently-
developed Battle Lab concept is designed to provide hands-on 
user involvement during this highly leveraged early part of 
the acquisition process. Better early planning and 
requirements definition, through M&S, will result in both more 
effective systems and lower life cycle costs. (BLG, 1992, p. 2) 
From a military perspective, anything short of war is a 
type of simulation. simulation for the Army refers to one (or 
a combination of) the following three types: 
1. "live" simulation, i.e., operations with real equipment 
in the field 
2. "constructive" simulation which deals with wargames, 
models and analytical tools 
3. "virtual" simulation refers to systems and troops in 
simulators on synthetic battlefields (Singley,~993,p.35). 
Technological pieces that may make up this simulation 
capability include a Distributed Interactive Simulation 
environment transmitted over the Defense Simulation Internet 
communications network linking Janus. a high resolution 
"constructive" model, Semi-automated forces, and the 
Battlefield Distributed Simulation - Developmental "virtual" 
simulator complex. Janus and Battlefield Distributed 
Simulation - Developmental are by no means the only 
constructive and virtual models available to the Army. 
However, for the purpose of this document they provide 
excellent examples of the potential simulation capabilities 
currently pursued by the Army. 
1. Distributed Interactive simulation and Protocol Data 
Units 
One of the main challenges to date is the attempt to 
integrate constructive and virtual simulation technologies. 
This is an ominous task, considering that these dissimilar 
computers and simUlators that the Army wants to combine into 
one integrated network weren't initially designed to 
communicate with one another. To achieve this desired, 
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seamless simulation capability requires simulated 
environment that provides a colltlTlon definition of standard 
terms, or protocols that will allow these different computers 
and simulators to colltlTlunicate. This common definition of 
standard terms is achieved by Distributed Interactive 
Simulation (DIS) Protocol Data units (PDUs). 
DIS creates a synthetic environment within which 
humans may interact through simulation at multiple, networked 
sites using compliant architecture, modeling, protocols, 
standards, and data bases. DIS and its POlls are the next 
generation of distributed simulation evolving from the 
Advanced Research Project Agency's (ARPA) research project of 
the 1980' s known as Simulation Network (SIMNET) . However, DIS 
is barely in its initial stages with many obstacles yet to be 
tackled. (IST,1993,p.4) 
DIS will take advantage of currently installed and 
future simulations manufactured by different organizations. 
consequently, must be found for assuring 
interoperabili ty between dissimilar simulations. The first 
step in achieving this interoperabili ty is to develop a 
colltlTlunications protocol. There must be an agreed-upon set of 
messages that communicate between host computers, the states 
of simulated and real entities , and the i r interactions. This 
information is colltlTlunicated through DIS PDUs. (1ST, 1993, p. 8) 
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2. simulation Standardization 
The current work on simulation standards began in 
August 1989 with the first workshop on Standards for the 
Interoperability of Defense Simulations. A second workshop 
took place in January 1990. As a result of these workshops 
and subsequent subgroup meetings, over 150 position papers 
containing recommendations for the standard were submitted to 
the Institute for simulation and Training (1ST). 
Using SIMNET as a baseline 1ST developed a first draft 
for a military standard which describes the form and types of 
messages to be exchanged between simulated entities in a DIS. 
A third workshop was conducted in August 1990 in which 
industry and Government provided feedback on the proposed 
standard . The final draft standard was submitted in January 
1991 and approved minor changes, which have been incorporated 
by the 1ST. This document has been submitted to the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) to become the 
IEEE standard. (IST,1993,p.9) 
Initial capability for implementing the end-state 
architecture has been established through the approval of IEEE 
Standard 1278, in March 1993, for DIS data exchange protocols 
for interconnecting constructive simulations. The Army is 
currently leading indUstry and the other Services in the 
deve lopment of the DIS architecture. Achievement of ful l end-
state capabilities will require continued work through near-
and mid-term periods. (DIS MODPLAN,1993,p.4) 
48 
3. Defense simulation Internet 
DIS operations are supported by a communication system 
known as the Defense simulation Internet (DSI). This 
communication system was deve l oped, and is currently operated 
by Advanced Research Projects Agency. The OSI consists of 
long-haul commercial telephone circuits over AT&T with nodes 
at the users' horne stations, and strategically placed 
"switching nodes" ("Fill: East and Fix West") with a central 
controlling facility in Chicago, IL . Connectivity is made to 
military and civilian satellites to allow wor l dwide, 
simultaneous DIS operations. (DIS MOOPLAN,1993,p.2) 
Presently, there are approll:imately thirty OSI nodes 
supporting all Services' command posts, Battle Simulation 
centers, test beds, Battle Labs, research centers, unified 
commands, and civil ian companies that support the military. 
The OSI is ell:pected to ell:pand over the nell:t year with 
approll:imately 25 additional sites. (DIS MOOPLAN,1993,p.2) 
Each location physically connec ted to the OSI network 
is referred to as a "OSI node." At present, the Army operates 
two TRAOOC Battle Lab nodes on the OSI; Fort Knoll: and Fort 
Rucker (Fort Rucker has been designated a Battle Lab support 
facility). Eventually the Army wishes to have sill: to eight 
Army Battl e Lab nodes and addi tional communications-only nodes 
to most major commands throughout the Army. 
(Singley, 1993, p. 37) 
Through the interperative capabilities of DIS and the 
communication network established by the DSI the Army will 
attempt to build its future by linking const ructive models 
such as Janus with virtual simulation networks such as BDS-D. 
Janus 
Janus is a computer-based, two-sided combat simulation 
model named for the two-faced Roman god of the portals, who 
was able to look in two directions simultaneously. Janus UNIX 
3.17, and Janus virtual Memory System (VMS) 4.0, are the most 
recent versions of the model that are now in common use. 
(Pate,1992,p.2) 
The Janus combat mode l accommodates up to 600 
individual combat systems (including up t o 100 indirect fire 
systems) per side, all moving, detecting, and firing over a 50 
kilometer2 , three-dimensional terrain representation. Combat 
systems (e.g., tanks, helicopters, dismounted infantry, etc.) 
are defined by the measured attributes of the real or notional 
systems being modeled (e.g., size, speed, sensor(s), armament, 
armor protection, thermal/optical contrast, etc.). The 
vulnerability of each system is characterized by data sets of 
probability of hit (PH) and probability of kill (Pd that 
individually assoc i ate each combat system with each weapon in 
the simulation. (Crooks,1992) 
Janus, because of its high resolution capabilities, 
has been used predominately in aiding analysts in Cost and 
50 
operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) and combat 
development system studies. It wasn't until recently that the 
concept of trying to integrate a constructive model with a 
virtual simulation environment was acted upon. Currently, one 
of the main thrusts of the Anti-Armor Advanced Technology 
Demonstration study is to merge constructive and virtual 
simulation worlds. This allows the orchestration of selected 
forces, within the virtual simulation environment, to be 
controlled from a constructive model such as Janus. This is 
referred to as semi-automated forces. 
5. Semi-Automated Forces 
To keep costs associated with experiments wi t hin 
budgetary constraints, Semi-Automated Forces (SAFaR) can be 
used to represent both friend l y (adjacent, supporting, and 
h i gher and l ower formations) and threat forces. The SAFaR 
capability allows a single individual sitting at a 
constructive model to control various sized units such as 
platoons, companies, or battalions within a virtual 
simulation. These forces appear on the virtual battlefield 
just as manned simulators do; the fact that they are SAFaR is 
transparent to the other players. (Loral, 1.992, p . 2) 
SAFOR is desirable from both a command and control and 
a costs savings perspective. Command and control is enhanced 
by the capability to control several systems on the virtual 
battlefield from a constructive mode l . savings are derived 
from constructive models that generate a system on the virtual 
battlefield much cheaper than virtual networks such as BDS-D. 
6. Battlefield Distributed simulation - Developmental 
The intent of M&S integration into the acquisition 
process is to simulate before you build, bUy, and fight. BDS-
D provides a "virtual" battlefield on which individuals can 
fight and analyze the effectiveness "deltas" resulting from 
the changes made in equipment, doctrine, tactics, 
organizations, and training methods. The sequence of the 
battle can be recorded and later analyzed in detail to refine 
those changes. 
This technology creates a simulated or, "virtual", 
battlefield on which users can conduct cost-effective 
experiments or exercises. The exercises are conducted using 
actual soldiers operating the simulators, thus permitting 
soldier-in-the-loop experimentation. Through a combination of 
local area and long haul networks (DSI), soldiers operating 
simulators at one site are able to see and interact with 
soldiers operating at other sites on a common digitized 
battlefield. (Loral,1992,p.3) 
The Battlefield Distributed Simulation - Developmental 
(BDS-D) program is sponsored by the U.S. Army. The COInI1lander, 
US Army Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command 
(STRICOM) is the Program Manager for the BDS-D effort. 
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STRICOM provides the focal point between DoD agencies, user 
agencies, industry, and the BDS-D sites. (Loral, 1992, p. 4) 
EDS-D in general will support experiments and 
evaluations in a variety of areas. Using the approach of 
simulating before and during the building and/or buying of a 
new weapon system, users are able to experiment with the 
design of a new or improved weapon system throughout its 
acquisition life cycle. For example, researchers can perform 
the following: 
• Define requirements accurately and assess trade-offs. 
• Explore the capabi li ties that should be incorporated into 
a n ew or existing system. 
• Investigate the numbers and allocation of the system that 
achieves optimum performance on the battlefield. 
• Determine the best means to employ the system once it is 
built (Loral,1992,p.4). 
The answers to issues such as these are important 
considerations to a program manager. similarly, users can 
experiment with new and innovative ways of employing weapon 
systems so that they better realize their design capabilities. 
Changes in organizational structure can also be analyzed to 
determine the relative effectiveness on the battlefield of 
competing organizations. ( Loral,1992,p.4) 
Facilitating this ambitious undertaking requires the 
development of local area networks consisting of low cost 
batt l efie l d simulators, and simUlations of experimental and 
high fidelity systems and SAFOR. These simulators will all be 
linked together via DSI to provide virtual combat operations 
in the DIS environment for materiel and combat development, 
and operational testing exercises. (Kelly, ~993, p. J.9) 
c. BATTLE LABS 
TRADoe has organized six Battle Labs to identify, develop 
and experiment with new warfighting concepts and new 
capabilities offered by emerging technologies . This 
initiative is a response to the unpredictability of the world 
situation, where a rapidly-changing array of direct and 
indirect challenges have replaced the single well-defined 
threat which drove doctrine and materiel requirements during 
the cold-war era. (BLG,~993,p.3) 
Battle Labs are focal points for examining the latest 
concepts of battlefield organization, tactics, doctrine and 
technological capabilities. They facilitate the flow of new 
ideas and are closely linked with the technology centers of 
both the Army and industry. Battle Labs experiment with new 
ideas, examine battlefield dynamics and capabilities offered 
by new technologies for their impact on the battlefield of the 
future, and integrate promising concepts across the Army. 
(BLG,~993,p.3) 
Battle Labs will be linked through the DSI to each other, 
the Army R&D community, sister services, 000, and national 
agencies. All are organizing to take advantage of the DIS 
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technology I which was not available to earlier test-bed 
operations. BD5-D networks will allow experts at the relevant 
TRADOC Centers - the people who think, write and teach 
warfighting - to advance ideas and test them by simulation 
synergistically at a nur:tber of locations. (BLG,1993,p.4) 
Battle Labs will provide the tools and standards to 
simUlate activities at a high level of realism, from theaters 
of war to factories and manufacturing processes. To date, the 
mechanism for entry into the synthetic battlefields has been 
through a few netted simulators and individual workstations. 
These will be greatly expanded in the 1990s to include the 
recanf igurable BDS-D simulators that will provide mixes of 
real ranges, virtual simulations and aggregated constructions 
- wargame representations . Multipurpose surrogates, such as 
SAFOR supported by computer emulation, will allow soldiers to 
participate or to be simulated in battles, as appropriate. 
(BLG,1993,p .6 ) 
Simulation tools and methodologies housed by Batt l e Labs 
offer industry a new area of innovative development that has 
potential far beyond its military application. Of particul ar 
interest is the use of concurrent engineering principles to 
reduce development time and speed the acquisition process. 
virtual prototypes will be produced, so design and 
manufacturing tradeoffs can be evaluated. Eventually the 
manufacturing process, the mil i tary system, and the system's 
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perfonnance may all be modeled and refined before the first 
piece of hardware is built. (BLG,1993,p.6) 
Synthetic environments will not completely replace 
hardware demonstrations as a means of introducing new 
capabilities to the user. However, given the increased costs 
of hardware development and test, contrasted with the 
decreased costs and increasing fidelity of reconfigurable 
simUlators, the emphasis will certainly shift over time. 
(BLG, 1993,p. 7) 
Battle Labs will help prepare the Army for the challenges 
of the next century. Unlike the manpower-intensive Louisiana 
Maneuvers of the 1940s, simUlation and Battle Labs will afford 
a basis for the Louisiana Maneuvers of the ~990s and beyond. 
(Ross,1993,p.18) 
D. LOUISIANA MANEUVERS 
The term Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) refers to the large-
scale military exercises carried out by Army General George 
Marshall in the pine forest of Louisiana in 1941 to prepare 
the fledgling Alnerican Army for combat in World War II. 
Today I s version of the maneuvers is intended to help prepare 
the Army to fight battles beyond the year 2000. 
(Holzer, 1993, p. 36) 
Relying heavily upon simUlation and modeling technologies, 
senior Army leaders will use LAM as " 01 to help save money 
by speeding the int !"o duction of prorr g new weapon systems. 
This is derived from quickly weeding out unworkable concepts, 
aiding in the development of new doctrine and genera l ly 
guiding the Army as it reshapes itself for meeting post cold-
war missions. (Holzer,1993,p.36) 
To accomplish this goal the Army int ends to rely upon LAM 
exercises that allow the Service to consider a l ternative types 
of weapons. According to Army Chief of Staff General Gordon 
Su l livan; 
You need to know that we will use simulation techniques 
throughout the Army's acquis i tion process. We will 
determine needs in large-scale, simulation-supported 
exercises that allow us to consider alternative sol utions 
that meet our needs. We will use drawings, diagrams and 
3-dimensional mOdels generated by computers, put them in 
constructive or virtua l environments, and compare 
alternatives both technical l y and tactically. 
The most promising t e chnologies will be tested by real 
soldiers, first in reconfigurable crew stations (BDS-D), 
then in full scale simulations (LAM). Fina l designs, 
production and assembly steps wil l also be simulated in 
virtual factories before actual prototypes are made. Then 
the actual and virtual prototypes will be exercised 
simul taneously to discover potential problems before 
production begins. Tactics, techniques, and procedures 
are also developed along with the system so that the 
system is fully ready for when produced. 
(Sulli van, 1993) 
President clinton, in his State of the Union Address, 
vowed that the men and women who serve under the Amer ican flag 
will be the best trained, best equ i pped, best prepared 
fighting force in the world. The current leadership of the 
Army is intent on using LAM - conducted by the Battle Labs, 
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exploiting technologies such as DIS, OSI, Janus, SAFOR, and 




This chapter contains analysis of identified shortcomings 
in the Army's current acquisition structure to ascertain 
whether or not M&S can enhance the process. The hypothesis is 
that modeling and simulation can provide the underlying 
foundation for the forthcoming acquisition revolution. 
Analysis will be conducted in the form of an Acquisition 
Programmatics Appraisal, in section Bi an evaluation of the 
Army's Organizational Mission Posture, section C; followed by 
an Army Acquisition Modeling and simulation Assessment, 
Section O. section E provides an Analysis Summary to lend 
continuity for the Conclusions and Recommendations that follow 
in Chapter VI . 
B. ACQUISITION PROGRAMMATICS APPRAISAL 
Kaoru Ishikawa, one of Japan's leading experts in quality 
assurance declares that "no amount of inspection or process 
control can compensate for an inferior design" (Ishikawa, 
1985,p.77) . 
Yet, the conclusions from the GAO report on acquisition 
reform state that the major problem in the acquisition process 
is the lack of new product requirements definition to 
facilitate a comprehensive design. What is it about DoD's 
59 
acquisition process that keeps leading us down a continuous 
path of poor product performance coupled with cost and 
schedule overruns? Ms. Preston, the Deputy under secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition reform states: 
We have today an acquisition system that evolved through 
the adoption of a myriad of rules, regulations, and laws 
that were intended to address a particular problem or 
public interest. The combined net effect of those rules, 
regulations, and laws is a system whose costs exceed any 
demonstrable benefit. (Preston,1993,p.3) 
Former ASA (RDA) stephen Conver illustrated the monetary 
impact of Ms. Preston's assessment in saying that, "Between 60 
to 70 cents of our acquisition dollar goes to process cost and 
only 40 to 30 cents towards the product. We owe the taxpayers 
more for their dollar". (Conver, 1992) 
The Comptroller General of the united states asks: 
Why, with an increased emphasis on sound development and 
testing of weapons, do we still witness major commitments 
to programs, such as the B-2 bomber and the Airborne Self-
Protection Jammer, without first demonstrating the system 
will meet critical performance requirements? Why, with 
improved cost-estimating policies and procedures, do we 
still see the unit costs of weapon systems such as the c-
17 transport doubling? Why, with the increased emphasis 
on developing systems that can be efficiently produced and 
supported, do we have weapons such as the Advanced Cruise 
Missile and Apache Helicopter, that encounter costly 
prodUction and support problems? (GAO,1992,pg.1) 
secretary of Defense Perry states that the acquisition 
process is flawed in fundamental ways. "It's flawed at the 
very beginning in determining the so-called requirements of a 
system, in that it deliberately isolates the requirements 
process from technical and program realities" (Perry,1987). 
What Mr. Perry is referring to is the Research and 
Advanced Technology portion of the acquisition cycle. The 
user generally develops the system's operational Requirements 
Document during phase a of the acquisition cycle, independent 
of both program management and industry. If the concept 
successfully passes the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) at MS 
I, then and only then, is a program manager's office 
established to further develop the system. This represents a 
major transfer of responsibility and data from the combat 
developer (user), having defined the operational requirements 
of the system, to the materiel developer (AMe and program 
manager) who further develop the concept through Phase I and 
beyond. 
It is at this point, Phase I, that design approaches and 
parallel technologies are pursued within the system concept. 
Supportability and manufacturing process design considerations 
are to be integrated into the system design effort early to 
preclude costly redesign efforts downstream in the process. 
Prototyping, testing, and early operational assessment of 
cri tical systems, subsystems, and components will be 
emphasized to insure that the system will function as required 
in its operational environment. If all proves successful then 
the system is given approval by the DAB at MS II for 
development approval. 
Is the above described process meeting our current 
procurement needs? If the acquisition process is still 
functioning efficiently as some still suggest why do 'ole keep 
coming back to questions along the lines of the Comptroller 
General? The research conducted on acquisition prograrnmatics 
identif ied, and analyzed, the following four areas: 
• Lack of integration among acquisition participants. 
Inadequate knowledge within the Army in the potential, and 
application, of computer and M&S technologies. 
Improper acquisition cost allocation and funding. 
Difficulty with technology transfer from concept to 
production. 
L Lack of Integration Among Acquisition Participants 
Chapter III , section 8, illustrates how the current 
acquisition process is both segregated and sequential. The 
decision making support system depicted in Figure 9 is 
indicative of this segregate nature. The Venn diagram shows 
the requirements process interfacing with acquisition 
management, and acquisition management interfacing with the 
PP8S and so forth. Figure 9 focuses on the middle of the Venn 
diagram, where the concurrent integration of R&D should take 
place. This is not addressed in the 000 5000.1. 
Filling this integration void will require a facility 
to house both the personnel and M&S assets required to conduct 
R&D in an integrated fashion. (Ferguson,~993) 
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General Franks, Commander of TRADOC, realized this 
requirement when he established the six Battle Labs under his 
Figure 9 Integrat~on Vo~d 
command. The value of Battle Labs is explained by Dr. George 
Singl ey, the Army's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research 
and Technology i 
In the past we've had engineers and scientist in our labs 
and centers who knew a particular technology as well as 
anyone in industry who was leading in that area of 
research. But in most cases, they didn't have a good feel 
for what the impact of technology would be in terms of 
operational capability, or at least be able to articulate 
it. On the other side, we've had combat development 
organizations who thoroughly understood combat 
developments, but who had not spent much time in the 
acquisition community or in the laboratories. So you had 
a gap in terms of knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
vision. The Battle Labs are an opportunity to integrate 
these folks, along with industry, and allow them to 
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iterate in a constructive environment. A fully developed 
Battle Lab concept will undoubtedly shorten the front end 
of the acquisition cycle. computer simu l ations alone, to 
say nothing of e nhanced cooperation among the various 
lab s, combat arms, and industry, will al l ow for quicker, 
more effective trade-off studies. The result will be 
clearer requirements in less time. (Slear,1992,pg.6) 
wi th Dr. singley controlling the 6.1-6. 3A RDT&E 
funding for the Army, such statements l end the needed support 
to get this innovative and integrated approach established 
within the Battle Labs and the Army a s a who l e. With respect 
t o requirements generat ion it appears no other agency or 
command wi thin the Army has the potential that can rival that 
of the Battle Labs. If integrate d a cquisition is the way of 
the future, Battle Labs, and its simUlation capabilities, have 
the highest probability of success for integrating the 
required entities of the requirements generation process. 
2 . Inadequate Computer Fundamentals Within the Army 
computer systems are becoming a predominant part of 
o ur major weapon systems. But the requisite knowledge of how 
to manage and deve l op these high-tech systems has yet to be 
established. This is particularly the case for the software 
of a system. In his address to t he acquisition students at 
the Naval Postgraduat e School, Major General Dewitt T . Irby, 
Program Executive Officer for Army Aviatio n Systems claimed, 
"Show me a program in trouble and I'l l show a program with 
soft ware problems" (Irby, 1993) . 
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Although software is critical to successfully meeting 
the cost, schedule, and performance objectives of major 
defense programs, the defense acquisition community has 
perceived software as secondary to hardware and as a lower 
priority during development. Viewing software as something 
that can be fixed later, program managers generally have not 
become involved in software development until software 
problems affect a system's cost, performance, or schedule; 
usually just before or during operational testing. Because 
DoD has not effectively balanced the hardware and software 
requirements of defense systems during development, software 
is generally immature when certified as ready for operational 
testing. (GAO,1993,p.4) 
During the period 1986 to 1989, over 90 percent of 
delays in Army Initial operational Test were the result of 
embedded software which was not yet able to support system 
functions (Paul,1992,p.40). In 1989 the Army established the 
Software Test & Evaluation Panel (STEP) to address the problem 
of delays in Army system operational test caused by immature 
software. STEP attributes this phenomenon to the following: 
Var ious studies have shown that most errors in operational 
software programs are caused by incorrect or ambiguous 
statements of requirements for the target system and user. 
Most of the errors exhibited in fielded software can be 
traced not to actual engineering defects, but to 
programmer's misunderstanding of the system and user 
requirements. STEP has proposed to reduce the number of 
these software errors through improved procedures to 
define user requirements for Army software products. 
(Paul,1992,p.41) 
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The Army must educate its personnel with the required 
computer knowledge to establish a base of computer s k ills that 
will preclude such errors in the future . without this 
knowledge the Army appears to keep repeating such mistakes. 
In his article "Software crisis - Is It a Matter of 
Guts Management?" Robert L. Glass contends that programs that 
managed by people lacking in hardware/software 
fundamentals are doomed for problems. Glass states; 
We simply do a bad job of estimating how long it will take 
to build software. It is obvious that poor estimation of 
requirements will cause poor cost and schedule 
performance. We can't meet schedule and budget goals 
because we are working to esti mates that were never valid 
to begin with. But what about unreliability? I would 
assert that troub l ed software projects, finding themselves 
badly behind schedule skimp on testing and release buggy 
software because it is their only hope of catching up. 
(Glass, 1993, p. 27) 
As the knowledge regarding computer technology 
increases, appropriate applications of M&S technologies can 
produce the level of requirements definition in system 
software that will generate realistic cost, performance and 
schedule baselines prior to the start of Phase II. A true 
commitment to educating the appropriate personnel is a must if 
progress in software requirements is to be made. 
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3. Improper Acquisition Cost Allocation and Fundinq 
cost Allocation 
The early part of the requirements definition and 
acquisition process is highly leveraged. This is where M&S 
can make major impacts in optimizing and streamlining systems 
procurement. Experience shows that, at the transition from 
technology development to MS II, only about 10 percent of the 
system's life cycle cost has been spent. However, decisions 
have been made that predetermine the remaininq 90 percent of 
the system's life cycle cost (Figure 10). (BLG,1993,p.2) 
COST ALLOCATION 
-- ---'WI 01' UFJ:. crcu: COST DlITDKDlED 
--'WI OF LIl'K CY"CtiI!l COST Sl'Dr'!' 
Fiqure ~O Cost Allocation 
It is the contention of this thesis that M&S 
make the most dramatic impact in this highly leveraged early 
part of the acquisition process by affording a greater 
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capability to define requirements and determine costs. 
Through M&S more R&D answers can be obtained in the critical 
first ~o percent which will more accurately analyze and 
forecast the cost and performance factors for the remaining 90 
percent. 
An example that displays this leveraging potential 
involves battle tank prototypes. In 1964, evaluations of 
possible improvements on the M1 Abrams tank were carried out 
by using real tanks in a live environment. The effort took 24 
months and cost $40 million. A later effort in 1966 used a 
modified aircraft dome simulator, took only six months and 
cost $1 million. In 1992, using DIS four variations of the M1 
Abrams were operated against potential threats, taking only 
three months and costing $640,000. (Berry,1992) 
Yet this portion of the acquisition cycle has 
historically been hurried through and underfunded in attempts 
to get a production commitment from Congress. 
GAO's rent report on weapons acquisition 
reinforces this ass",rtion by stating; 
As a program proceeds through development, the disposition 
for sponsors to present program information optimistically 
and to protect the program against disruption intensifies. 
This behavior is necessary to overcome the numerous 
challenges a program faces as it commands increasing funds 
and faces potential criticism. At the same time, program 
support grows because more acquisition participants have 
become active sponsors and because the time and money 
invested have built a compelling argument for continuing 
the program . Together, these factors compliment the 
initial efforts to push the program and begin to pull it 
through the acquisition process. They enable the program 
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to develop 'a life of its own' and to become its own 
objective. Thus, even when the very underpinnings of a 
program are badly shaken, very strong arguments are made 
by participants at all levels to continue the program as 
planned. This is particularly true for programs that have 
entered the engineering and manufacturing phase (Phase II) 
by which time it is generally conceded that the programs 
are committed to production. Ironically. if a weapon has 
serious problems, these problems are most likely to 
surface during this phase when the program has become 
virtually unstoppable. (GAO,1992,p.46) 
Traditional problems of cost and schedule overruns 
coupled with the lack of accurate requirements are still 
prevalent in the acquisition system. This lends credence to 
the argument that a redistribution of life cycle cost are in 
order. It also falls in line with the adage, "we can't afford 
to build it right the first time but we can afford all the 
retrofits and modifications stemming from inadequate 
requirements and an inferior design." 
The technological capabilities within our M&S 
assets can revolutionize the way we conduct the first two 
phases of the acquisition process. with the aid of M&S, a 
system can more accurately be evaluated in pre-milestone II 
efforts thereby reducing the overall cost of a weapon system 
by more accurately defining requirements and optimizing the 
design. 
b. z'unding 
Analysis of the RDT&E budget is required to see if 
the Technology Base will support the M&S analysis in the 
development port i on of the acquisition cycle. The RDT&E 
budget is decreasing but is this in the form of vertical cuts 
to support these emerging M&S technologies? Figure ~~ lends 
pessimism to the prospect of the RDT&E base supporting M&S 
through the development portion of Program 6 funding. 
ARMY RDT&E BUDGET 
FY91-FY94 
Figure 11 RDT&E Budget FY91-FY94 
Exploratory and Advanced Development are the most 
critical portions of the RDT&E Budget for supporting the 
requirements generation process. Figure ~~ also reveals that 
both these accounts have declined over the past three years 
~O . ~ and 26.6 percent respectively. Even more indicative of 
the Army ' s inability to promote its M&S efforts is the 
elimination of all funding under the Modeling and simulation 
Authorization Line. 
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The Army has been able to sustain its current M&S 
efforts by channelling funding from other accounts. This 
method of financing leads to piecemea l procurements that 
continue to contribute to the lack of interoperability that 
currently exists within the Army's M&S assets. 
A classic quote from the movie 'The Right Stuff' 
states, "no bucks no Buck Rogers". The same may hold true for 
the prospect of a robust M&S architecture. Batt l e Labs and 
M&S have been able to obtain funding directly from program 
managers and other sources but its standing in the FYDP has 
all but diminished. According to Rear Admiral (Ret.) 
Milligan, former Budgeting Officer for the Department of the 
Navy, "Acquiring and maintaining funding in the FYDP requires 
a great deal of planning and a h igh degree of gamesmanship. 
Those who don't survive in the FYDP usually don't survive" 
(Milligan,1994) . 
Long term RDT&E funding is critical to procuring 
the required M&S hardware and software assets. Although way 
behind the power curve there are some indications that funding 
relief may be in sight. In the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY 1994 the Senate Armed Services committee 
recommended the following i 
The committee is pleased by the progress the Army has made 
in advancing the state-of-the-art in advanced distributed 
simulation. The Army has demonstrated that simUlation can 
be a valuable tool for enabling the Army Battle Labs to 
evaluate the military worth of promising technology and 
new concepts of warfighting. The committee supports the 
Army initiative to involve industry and academia in the 
Battle Lab simulation process. Given the progress made in 
t his effort and the positive public statements of the 
senior Army leadership regarding the worth of this 
program, the committee is perplexed to find that no 
funding has been budgeted to continue the program. The 
committee recommends $10.0 million for the program and 
reduces the funding of other Army programs by the same 
amount. (SASC, 1 993,p.68) 
It is interesting to note that even at the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that individuals are perplexed that 
programs as important as M&S and Battle Labs can be omitted 
from the budget. There is an error in strategic planning if 
the Army expects to fully implement the capabilities of M&S 
and Batt l e Labs without establishing funding through the 
appropriate means. For M&S to reach its full potential it 
must be firmly rooted in the Future Years Defense Plan. 
4. Technology Transfer From concept to Production 
The Congress of the United States' Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) procl aimed that in today's 
technology intensive environment the ability of 
organization to compete and win is highly dependent on its 
ability to discover, develop, and apply advances in science 
and technology to its systems and products. Success in that 
endeavor depends, in turn, on the ability of the organization 
to plan its technology investment strategy, marshal the 
resources to support it, and build and sustain a technology 
base vital enough to produce the needed advances. 
(OTA,1989,p.41) 
Continuity of technology transfer from concept to 
production is a must for an acquisition strategy that is 
progressive in nature; evolving from S&T, to ATD's, to systems 
application. This continuity must be established in areas of 
facilities, personnel and resources, and documentation. 
a. Facilities 
The research conducted found that the TRADOC Batt le 
Labs offer the Army integrated facilities where combat and 
materiel developers, industry, and academia may interact on 
the acquisition process. The evolution of this acquisition 
process must span across the areas of Basic Research (6.1 
funds), Exploration Development (6.2 funds), and Advanced 
Development (6.3 funds). This span, in terms of facilities 
and agencies, may typical ly evolve through the boundaries of 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Army Research 
Laboratory (ARL) , to the effected branch of the Army, or 
Battle Labs, for Advanced Development. For Battle Labs to 
meaningfully contribute the acqu isition process in the future, 
they must have "Basic Research" facilities that can be readily 
accessed. 
The agencies mentioned need not be co-located if 
they can be interactive for concurrent development efforts. 
Through DIS, the location of facilities becomes less and less 
important. If the organization is structured to permit the 
necessary exchange of research and support, continuity is 
maintained as the program evolves. 
b. Personne~ and Resources 
A strong development program must link the S&T 
personnel to the developers and to the ultimate user of the 
systems. Senior leaders within the Army interviewed for this 
thesis pointed to Battle Labs to provide that process 
continuity. Both General Saint, the fonner Commander of the 
U.S. Army Europe, and Lieutenant General Forster, the Military 
Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for RD&A, both 
had strong opinions in favor of the Battle Labs. 
General Saint stated; 
The soldier must be brought in from the start and not just 
as a validation source at the end of the acquisition 
process. We must start and end our the acquisition cycle 
based on the needs and inputs from ' our soldiers and I feel 
the Battle Labs will contribute significantly in that 
fashion. (Saint, ~993) 
While LTG Forster addressed the continuity factor 
specifically; 
Battle Labs br i ng the user and buyer together early on in 
the acquisition process. Before Battle Labs, once the ROC 
and the RFP were written the combat developer was long 
forgotten. Now they will remain in the loop to model Pre-
Planned Product Improvements and continuing upgrades to 
the system. This lends continuity to the process that was 
lost in ear l ier years. (Forster,~993) 
with the promise that Batt l e Labs display it was 
interesting to find that the host centers for the Battle Labs 
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are not allocated any personnel or resources to staff them. 
Almost all of the personnel within the Battle Labs are 
transfers from the host center's combat developments. This 
equates to a very small organic staff for the Battle Labs. 
"Battle Labs are not resources," insists Colonel Don Kerr, 
director of the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Lab at Fort 
sill, OK. "Our mission is to try to leverage off someone 
else's work. I only have eight guys here full-time, so we'll 
be pulling in the experts." (Slear,1992,p.5) 
Lack of personnel dedicated to the Battle Labs 
could prove detrimental to the continuity of the acquisition 
process if this facility cannot be adequately staffed with 
qualified personnel. In a zero-gain Army, this equates to 
these personnel being staffed at the expense of another 
organization. The research indicated that there was a 
substantial overlap in the Concepts and Studies, and M&S 
portions of Combat Developments and Battle Labs . Much can be 
gained by combining these Combat Developments personnel and 
resources with Battle Labs. 
First, Battle Labs wou l d gain additiona l resources 
in terms of personnel, equipment, and funding to support its 
base of operation. Secondly, Battle Labs. conducting analysis 
under one of the six battlefiel d dynamics, will produce a 
better integrated sol ution than a parochial laden center. 
Lastly, it reduces yet another layer of organiZational 
structure that requires overhead, integration, and support far 
beyond any demonstrable measure. 
c. Documenta tion 
The Office of Technology Assessment found that none 
of the Services possess a formal written document outlining 
the prerequisite procedures for successful technology transfer 
(OTA,~989,p.54). If the Army has an acquisition plan for the 
efficient evolution of data from basic research to systems 
application, it is not known by any of the individuals 
interviewed or found in any source documents. In fact, the 
only documentation found (OTAs) cites the contrary to any such 
plan. 
Getting a program approved through Milestone I 
requires a minimum of fourteen major reports, documents, and 
analysis. For Milestone II the total is nineteen. Attempting 
to capture the consolidated performance of a program is very 
difficult in such a myriad of assorted paperwork. Serious 
reduction of the number of required reports to facilitate the 
acquisition of a system is in order. 
Recent trends show that the number of COEAs 
performed by the Army is decreasing while the number ATDs is 
increasing. This is to be expected given the new acquisition 
strategy focusing on technology demonstrations. How can the 
research from the ATDs be efficiently incorporated into the 
required documentation of a system without losing continuity 
of the data during the transfer? Having the required 
documentation of an ATD be aligned with acquisition documents 
such as the COEA is worth consideration. Or, with the 
distributed capabilities of computer technology, establish a 
database account for all research conducted on a specific 
technology or system . These data can then be accessed when 
developing the required documentation for a weapon system. 
This would ensure that a ll documents and data are contained 
within the "entire scope of research" enabling full and 
consistent analysis. 
While outside the scope of this thesis a worthwhile 
endeavor would be to pursue the effectiveness of an enhanced 
and expanded COEA. with the ability through M&S to make 
accurate operational effectiveness and cost projections, many 
current supporting documents could be incorporated into this 
enhanced COEA to provide more continuity and centralization to 
the documentation process. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION POSTORE 
For modeling and simulation to be effective the Army 
organizational structure must acquire, integrate, and support 
M&S technologies throughout the acquisition cOlTllllunity. The 
major cOlTllllands within the Army have differ ent primary 
interests for the use of these technologies and in the means 
to s upport them. From an acquisition point of view, these 
interests may not be supportive of one another. 
Organizational mission posture is addressed from the 
following three perspectives. First, is the optimal mix of 
M&S resources being acquired by the Army? Secondly. are these 
M&S resources aligned with the appropriate commands, in terms 
of mission and support, or can a better alignment of these 
technologies be made? Lastly, is every organization capable 
of performing its assi gned mission in live, virtual, or 
constructive simulation environments? 
1.. M&S optimizat.ion 
The Distributive Interactive Simulation Modernization 
Plan, dated 17 May 1993, asserts that, "everything but combat 
is simulation" (DIS MODPLAN,1993). This is becoming an ever 
more popular theme throughout the Department of Defense as 
researchers and scientists attempt to retain their analytical 
capability in times of dwindling resources. As the Army 
transforms into the age of simulation, it must not forget the 
regulatory and organization frameworks that bind our 
acquisition process, and the reasons they were originally 
established. The goal of any acquisition simulation 
architecture, wi thin the Army, should be to support and 
streamline the acquisi t i on process; not to circumvent it. 
As d i scussed previously, simulation in the Army is 
comprised of one, or a combination of, the following three 
environments: I ive simulation is defined as operations with 
real troops and equipment in the field; virtual Simulation 
consists of systems and troops in simulators fighting on 
synthetic battlefields; and Constructive simUlation is the use 
of wargames, models and analytical tools. 
Given the above definitions, if the Army's true 
philosophy is, "anything but combat is simulation", then the 
question is not "Do we use simulation?", but rather "What type 
of simulation do we use?". 
Under this philosophy how we procure and test our 
weapon systems becomes a matter Df balancing our simulation 
assets; a ratio of live, virtual, and constructive 
environments. This warrants trying to find an optimal ratio 
between the three simulation environments that will provide 
the greatest return for the acquisition dollar. Without this 
prerequisite knowledge of requirements, the fragmented 
procurement of simulation technologies will most likely fall 
short of the Army's needs. 
The high demand for simulation is being fueled by the 
decreasing amount of dollars being spent on defense. L.;i.yg 
~ is very costly but yields a high degree of fidelity 
and definition in terms of analytical feedback. Virtual 
Simulation is not nearly as costly (in terms of time, people, 
equipment, and money) as live simulation but in most cases 
does not yield the same degree of analytical definition. 
Constructive Simulation provides a high level of post 
processed data, at a very low cost, but lacks the man-in-the-
loop input to capture more of the humanistic factors of 
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analysis. The objective now becomes to find an optimal mix 
between these three environments that wil l meet the Army's 
acquisition needs. The solution to this optimization is found 
in basic economic theory (Figure J.2). (Gates,J.993J 
M&S OPTIMIZATION 
~.L _ _ __ D C : " 
' A' • 
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Figure 12 Economl.C Theory to H&S Optimizatl.on 
Given the current budgetary constraints facing the 
Army what combination of these three assets provides the 
greatest analytical return? The Army can afford to buy 
combinat i ons at point A or point A', but it can do better. 
consider point B, where the ratio is on the highest possible 
indifference curve (curve OJ, given our budget constraint. 
All points on indifference curve C are outside the budget 
constraint, so the Army cannot afford them. Thus, Point B 
maximizes our analytical utility subject to the indifference 
curves (curves D & E) located within the budget constraint. 
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Note that even on the least costly curve (curve E) that sale 
reliance on either live or other-than-live simulation may fall 
outside the Army's available resources. 
It appears the Army has neither defined its total 
simulation requirements, for the appropriate simulation 
architecture, nor has it established a simulation budget 
within the Future Years Defense Plan. Individual efforts have 
been made in the Distributed Interactive simulation and Battle 
Lab Master Plans but this does not provide the total 
requirements necessary when addressing the Army's overall 
simulation network. The FY 1994 Army RDT&E Budget contains 
$0.00 under its Modeling and simulation Authorization Line. 
something is amiss. 
without such forecast and preplanning when and how 
will the Army know when it has the optimum mix of simulation 
asset? What are the criteria for successful implementation? 
Procurement without a strategy, implementation plan, or budget 
leads to fragmented, piecemeal purchases. 
Currently, the number of Army M&S programs and 
proposals far exceed the available resources to support them. 
For the time being, the Army appears content to acquire its 
M&S assets in a decentralized manner. For the Army to 
successfully implement a strategy capable of fulfilling its 
modeling and simulation needs it should consider doing so 
under a centralized acquisition plan. 
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2. M'S Alignment 
The physical alignment of M&S assets throughout the 
Army appears to be very logicaL Since the predominant 
mission of virtual, or BDS-D, simulators is training and 
acquisition related, one expects to find these assets located 
at TRADoe installations. The constructive models are 
dispersed throughout the Army since they are used for anything 
from combat developments to materiel analysis . 
What is surprising is the proponent or ownership 
relationship of the virtual simulators. All BDS-D simulators 
are currently positioned at TRADOC installations, under the 
proponency of AMC, STRICOM, being run by a civilian 
corporation, Loral . As might be expected this Government 
Owned - Contractor Operated (GoeO) relationship is not popular 
among some of the people in the TRADOC community. Loral was 
faci li tating and expeditious in support of this research but 
some conducting business with them are quite frustrated. 
At first glance it would seem to be simple enough to 
place the control of these virtual assets under the control of 
TRADOC and the user community. However, the ownership and 
control of these simulators is quite valued. 
with the Army downsizing Major Commands (MACOMs) are 
l aying claim to most anything that will keep them from 
absorbing further reductions. These simulators are no 
exception. In fact , many that were interviewed looked at this 
as a major power struggle between TRADOC, AMC, and the Program 
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Executive Officers. LTC Bowen stated, "TRAnOC is anxious to 
embrace Battle Labs and BDS-D as a big player because it will 
shift a major portion of the acquisition policy power to 
TRADOC. For this very same reason PMs, AMC, and STRICOM, will 
most likely postulate for status quo" (Bowen,1993). Colonel 
P. J. Penny, the Director of simulations at Fort Rucker was a 
bit more direct, "Battle Labs will fail because PEDs and PMs 
don't play in the process" (Penny, 1993) . 
Colonel Penny's point is well taken. Most of the 
analysis done in Battle Labs and BDS-D is in the area of ATDs 
or requirements generation . This is prior to MS I and the 
initiation of a program management office. 
Modeling and simulation resources need to be 
responsive to the user because streamlined acquisition is 
dependent upon a more thorough requirements development 
process. Therefore, realignment of the control of virtual M&S 
assets is in order. 
3. Mission capability 
Many in the Army are hesitant in the use of 
simulation. Their concern is that simulation is a poor 
substitute for live operations or testing. This is a 
misconception in that virtual or constructive simulation is 
not intended to replace live operations or testing (live 
simulation) . The attempt is to supplement live simulation 
with less expensive simulation methods so when performing in 
a live environment, less iterations of this costly method are 
required. 
Figure 13 illustrates how variation, throughout the 
acquisition process, reduced through the 
supplementation of virtual and constructive simulation. This 
reduction in variation is gained from the ability to test user 
requirements in virtual and constructive environments prior to 
production. Decreasing variation in the acquisition process 
will produce reductions in both cost and schedule while more 
efficiently meeting the user's requirements. 
M&S IMPACTS 
ON REQUIREMENTS 
Figure ~3 M&S Impacts on Acquisition and Testing 
However, the application of M&S generates the question 
of how organizations within the acquisition community are 
resourced to perform their missions throughout all three 
simulation environments. 
The development of each weapon system is a cycle of 
requirements generation, system design, and system production, 
with testing being an iterative process throughout the cycle. 
This is depicted in the terms of an acquisition "loop" in 
Figure 14. 
MISSION DEFINITION 
"CWSING THE LOOP" 
Figure 14 Closl.nq the Acquisl.tl.on Loop 
Acquisition organizations (TRADOC, AMC, and OPTEC) are 
currently staffed to perform their mission in a "live" 
simulation environment. This s hould not be surprising for 
this is typically the way the Army has conducted business :for 
decades with the exception of the semantical transfer from 
"live" t o "live simulation". 
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However, as the simulation environment transfers to 
the "virtual" and "constructive" realms the organizational 
level of preparedness for some in the acquisition community 
begins to diminish. It is the independent testing portion of 
this cycle or "loop" that is most dramatically impacted. 
The operational testing community has a most difficult 
role in defining when, where and how it can participate 
outside the live environment. Testers find themselves caught 
between the live fire requirements within Title 10, the United 
states Code, and the spiral of diminishing defense dollars. 
This is a most dangerous position. 
The Defense Modeling and Simulation Office is funding 
simUlation efforts throughout the Services to test the merits 
of simUlation and operational testing. Data are still 
insufficient to assess the current ability to utilize other-
than-live environments for operational testing. However, it 
is only a matter of time until technology provides the 
required simUlation fidelity that will make virtual simUlation 
a viable alternative for some early and follow-on portions of 
operational assessments. 
At this juncture, how will the Army's operational 
testing community be postured to perform its mission? 
Requirements for independent testing will not vanish simply 
because of increased transfer from live to virtual 
env ironments. Rather, regulatory and organizational 
requirements should be established for materiel development 
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under each simUlation environment to "close the acquisi tion 
loop". 
History has proven time and time again that human 
nature is not capable of overcoming the conflict of interest 
generated by combat and materiel deve lopers conducting their 
own operational tests. This s hould not be forgotten as some 
senior leaders within Congress and the Army push for the 
abolishment of the independent tester based on the new found 
capabilities of simulation. 
As the Army moves more and more towards the virtual 
and constructive environments the merits of independent 
testing should not be forgotten. There must be an accredited 
means to accommodate the testing community in virtual and 
constructive environments. The alternative to traditional 
independent testing is systems being developed and 
operationally tested, by the same command, in simulated 
environments. This conflict of interest must be avoided at 
all cost. The Army cannot afford to succumb to budgetary 
pressures by abandon ing independent testing in virtual and 
constructive environments. The foresight of tomorrow's 
operational testing requirements must be applied, now, if the 
Army is to successfully operate across the simulation 
continuum in the future. 
D. ACQUISITION MODELING AND SIMULATION ASSESSMENT 
Assessing how far the Army has to go to bring this 
simulation technology to fruition, requires a baseline of 
current capability. Glenn Conrad, a systems engineer for 
MITRE Corporation, may have best assessed the Army's current 
status in converting to the high-tech arena when he stated, 
"The Army seems intent on trying to impose a management plan 
on an organization that is not yet resourced to receive it" 
(Conrad, 1993). 
Many interviewed attributed the perceived M&S capability 
that the Army has been given credit for to an extensive media-
blitz through military magazines, articles, journals and other 
such related documents. The fact remains that the Army and 
000 are a ways off from harnessing these high-tech 
capabilities in terms of both technology, and fiscal 
resources. The media seems to be catching on. 
Between June and September of 1992, the Army ran a test 
called the synthetic Environment Experiment at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky. The experiment pitted MIAI and MIA2 Abrams main 
battle tanks against a force of "composite" enemy tanks in a 
series of simulated engagements. There were two main thrusts 
of the study. One was to compare the combat performance of 
the MIAl, the Army's premier tank, with that of its successor, 
the MIA2, which is scheduled to be fielded in December of 
1995. The other was to evaluate the usefulness of simulation 
technology in improving the acquisition process. 
(Naylor, 1993, p. 34) 
The synthetic Environment Experiment failed to show any 
additional benefit derived from fielding the M1A2 tank. The 
simulation technology was lacking in sophistication and 
resolution to replicate fully the modern battlefield and to 
distinguish the difference between the two versions of the 
Abrams. This fault is not as important when simulators are 
used for training, for which BDS-D was originally designed. 
However, this causes problems in the acquisition process 
because weapons developers need precise data to design systems 
and determine if planned improvements will increase combat 
effectiveness. (Naylor, 1993, p. 34) 
LTC Hardy, the Army project officer for the experiment 
stated that the Army did not come out of this experiment 
feeling it had demonstrated M&S was not appropriate for 
systems evaluation, rather officials now know where they 
stand, and how far M&S has to go, before it can be of real 
benefit to the acquisition community. (Naylor,1993,p.34) 
Hardy did not predict how much time or money would be 
required to overcome the technological hurdles currently in 
the path of the acquisition-oriented simulation. However, LTC 
Hardy stated, "The Army is developing a master plan, and a 
modernization plan, which will apply resources to fixing the 
problems •••. To the extent we can apply resources to these 
problems and deficiencies, then we'll be able to get where 
we'd like to go." (Naylor,1993,p.34) 
These stated deficiencies have yet to be defined and 
incorporated into an Army M&S requirement. Acquisition M&S 
assets are a conglomerate of interdependent technologies. As 
such, the desired capability of the end product should be 
addressed as a system. If M&S technologies aren't fielded 
under centralized procurement, the Army may exhaust its 
resources before obtaining the desired final product . 
In an integrated acquisition environment strategic 
investments into M&S technologies should support the 
requirements of the participants. In the Army, this rests 
within defining miss i on needs, establishing realistic 
requirements, and ensuring an accurate design. However, 
within industry the emphasis is quite different. This 
contrasting relationship between the Army and industry is 
illustrated in Figure 25. 
Industry M&S participation at the beginning of the 
acquisi tion cycle is low. As opposed to the Army, it is not 
cost effective for industry to invest significant funding 
until contract award appears inuninent. This is reflected in 
Figure 15 just prior to the MS II timeframe. However, after 
contract award at MS II, industry M&S efforts start increasing 
signif i cantly in the form of computer-aided-design, computer-
aided-manufacturing, and virtual simulators spec!f ically 
developed to support the product under development. 
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Two examples of these simulators are the McDonnell Douglas 
AH-64 simulator complex in Mesa, Arizona, and the Sikorsky 
RAH-66 simulator complex in stratford, Connecticut. 
M&S 
DISTRIBUTION 
Figure 15 H&B Distribution - Army va Industry 
The AH-64 simulator has been instrumental in the Follow-On 
Test and Evaluation of the AH-64 and in contributing to the 
applied technology transfer of the Longbow acquisition system 
to the aircraft. It makes little sense for the Army to spend 
additional resources to procure this post-MS II capability 
with this M&S capability already fielded and under contract. 
The above contention is extremely relevant in defining the 
M&S requirements for the Army. In the case of the Abrams tank 
it is quite probable that the capabilities that LTC Hardy is 
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in need of already reside within the capabilities of the 
contractor for the Abrams. 
Acquisition of any M&S assets should be pursued under the 
auspices of integrated acquisition and dual use technology. 
M&S requirements definition of the Army should consider the 
resources residing within all participants of the Army 
acquisition process. Within this consideration, the most 
appropriate and beneficial area for the Army to procure 
organic M&S assets is in the pre-MS II period. Post MS II 
efforts can be conducted in conjunction with the awarded 
contractor to preclude the redundant procurement of M&S 
assets. 
Many of the Army's acquisition deficiencies can be 
overcome by adopting a more integrated approach to 
acquisition. TRADOC's Battle Labs appear to have the greatest 
potential for providing the required integrated capability. 
However, Battle Labs lack the appropriate resources, mainly in 
terms of personnel and the appropriate funding. If the vision 
of integrating the Battle Labs throughout the acquisition 
cycle is to reach fruition, a realignment of Army personnel 
and funding is a must. 
Additionally, organizations within the Army acquisition 
community must be prepared to function in concert with all 
three simulation environments. This requires the foresight to 
train personnel on the applicable computer skills in 
conjunction with making regulatory and organizational 
adjustments to accommodate emerging M&S technologies. 
Finally, requirements definition in support of the Army's 
M&S architecture must be accomplished for the Future Years 
Defense Plan. This should include the number and type of each 
asset required to facilitate acquiring a complete M&S 
architecture. Without this required analysis the Army stands 




This thesis focused on whether the Army is postured in 
terms of policy, technology, f unding and organizational 
structure to advantage the capabilities of current and 
forthcoming M&S potential. In addit ion, the 000 5000 series 
and the Army acquis ition organizat i onal structure were 
examined to determine whether or not their architecture would 
house the future methods of conducting acqui sition busines s. 
The final area of analysis focused on the RDT&E funding levels 
provided for Army M&S to see if t his would afford the 
realization of the Army I s M&S vision. 
Modeling and simulation provides the Army with a 
revolutionary means to enhance the current acquisition 
process . However, the segregate and sequential s tructure of 
the current 000 5000 series does not fully support the 
concurrent and integrated requirements for acqui s ition 
streamlining . Of major concern is the fact that the Army has 
yet to establish support for M&S in the RDT&E budget. 
Realignment of assets and personnel wi thin the current 
Army acquisition organi zational structure will provide a more 
capable requirements generation process. Battle Labs are 
TRADOC's current effort to establis h this continuity base for 
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the requirements generation process. However, Battle Labs 
lack the authorized personnel and funding required to sustain 
their progress in the future. 
As Army acquisition organizations increasingly transfer to 
the "virtual" and "constructive" environments, the 
organizational mission capability for some in the acquisition 
community begins to diminish . The operational testing 
community is most dramatically impacted. Testers find 
themselves caught between the live fi re requirements within 
Tit l e 10, the United states Code, and the spiral of 
diminishing defense dollars. OPTEC has a most difficult role 
in defining when, where, and how to participate outside the 
live environment. 
Finally, the number of Army M&S programs and proposals far 
exceed the available resources to support them. For the time 
being, the Army appears content to acquire its M&S assets in 
a decentralized manner. 
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 
The following specific conc l usions contribute to the above 
assessment: 
• The current 000 5000 series is structured for a process 
that is both segregate and sequential . 
• Mode ling and simulation assets must be more responsive to 
the requirements generation process if acquisition 
streamlining is to be achieved. 
• The current 10/90 percent cost allocation, at MS II, does 
not support an adequate requirements generation process. 
• Army M&S potential is most dramatic in the pre-MS II 
phases. 
• Post-MS II efforts can be conducted in conjunction with 
the awarded contractor to preclude the redundant 
procurement of M&S assets. 
• Required computer knowledge and skills, within the Army, 
are insufficient to support both the software technology 
the Army is producing, and, the M&S technology that 
supports the Army acquisition process. 
• Battle Labs lack the authorized personnel and funding 
required to sustain their progress in the future. 
• The Army's Exploratory and Advanced Development Accounts 
have decreased 10.1 and 26.6 percent respectively. Zero 
dollars were allotted for M&S in FY 1994. Lack of funding 
in the RDT&E budget seriously jeopardizes M&S's capability 
to support the Army acquisition process in the future. 
• The degree to which M&S will impact the Army acquisition 
process is dependent on how well M&S and Battle Labs are 
represented in the Future Years Defense Plan. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implementation of the following recommendations should 
enable M&S to impact beneficially on the Army acquisition 
process: 
• The Concepts and Studies l and M'S sections of Combat 
Developments should be consolidated with the Battle Lab 
Network to enhance the Army1s requirements generation 
process. Battle Labs provide an integrated environment 
Where M&S assets can most beneficially impact the Army 
acquisition process. Consolidation would provide three 
major enhancements to the requirements generation process. 
First, Battle Labs would gain significant resources in 
terms of personnel, equipment , and funding. Secondly, 
Battle Labs, conducting ana l ysis under the umbr ella of 
battlefield dynamics, will produce a better integrated 
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solution than a parochial laden center. Lastly, it 
reduces yet another layer of organizational structure that 
requires overhead, integration, and support far beyond any 
demonstrable measure. 
• Continuity of teohnology transfer.. from oonoept to 
produotion, should be established in terms of 
dooumentation. Research from the ATDs must be efficiently 
incorporated into the required documentation for a system. 
Having the required documentation of an ATD align with 
other acquisition documents, such as the COEA, is 
essential. Or, establish a consolidated database account 
for all research conducted on a specific technology or 
system. These data can then be accessed when developing 
the required documentation for a weapon system. This 
would ensure that all documents and data contain the 
"entire scope of research" and not just fragTIlented 
portions; enabling full and consistent analysis. 
• Pursuit of an enhanced and expanded COEA should be 
initiated. Through M&S, the ability to make accurate COEA 
projections dramatically increases. This affords the 
opportunity to consolidate many current supporting 
documents into an enhanced COEA to provide more continuity 
and centralization to the documentation process. 
• The Army should develop a oentralized proourement plan 
that indexes implementation of an aoquisition M&S 
strategy. This plan should consider increasing M&S 
efforts, prior to MS II, to enhance requirements 
generation. In addition to M&S procurement, this plan 
must consider the personnel training requirements for the 
use of high technology modeling and sinlUlation assets. 
• The operational testing community should 1:Ie aooredited in 
virtual and oonstructive environments. As the Army 
increases its efforts in virtual and constructive 
environments the merits of independent testing should not 
be forgotten. The alternative to traditional independent 
testing is a system being developed, and operationally 
tested, by the same command, in simulated environlllents. 
This conflict of interest must be avoided at all cost. 
The Army cannot afford to succumb to budgetary pressures 
by abandoning independent testing in virtual and 
constructive environments. Tomorrow's operational testing 
requirements must be addressed, now, if the Army is to 
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